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Introduction
In my master thesis I examine the stance of the Kemalist elite towards liberalism. I 
approach it as a competing political program of modernization and as one opposed to that of the 
RPP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – Republican People’s Party) in the period of 1922-1945. 
According to the prevalent viewpoint in most of historical analyses of the early republican 
history of Turkey, the path to the formation of the new state and the viewpoint of the ruling elite 
clashed with the liberal ideal. The hybrid ideological nature of Kemalism, as the dominant trend 
of Turkish nationalism, and its distance from other existing paradigms is clearly captured by 
Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk)’s phrase uttered during the debate on the abolition of the sultanate, ‘Biz 
bize benzeriz’ (We resemble ourselves). Through the study of the government’s acts and the 
intellectual debates of the period, I show that certain aspects of liberalism, such as constitution, 
rule of law, popular sovereignty and representative government, are an organic part of any 
modern political system, including Turkey's, and that any state has to adopt at least some of them 
if it is to be regarded as modern. 
I decided to focus in this question after my initial research in the secondary literature 
about the political history of the Early Turkish republic. 
First, intellectual history, in conjunction with political and social history, understood as 
reffering to the social basis of support for competing political programs, can be an efficient 
perspective from which to study the creation of hegemony in a society. I believe that any 
meaningful historical analysis about hegemony must focus on two levels: the acts of a party, 
government and regime, and the ideological justification of these acts through the elites’ texts. In 
other words, the process of persuasion, coercion and control of the lower classes regarding a 
specific political program can be illuminated by the study of the public interventions by the 
elites. In making this assumption, and especially in the case of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, I 
do not assume that the masses followed these debates directly and, through propaganda texts, to 
have been persuaded for the necessity of a specific political program. Those intellectual debates 
  
and their texts were limited to the various factions within the Turkish elite and were the main 
way to secure the elite’s cooperation with the Kemalist political program. Their cooperation 
would allow them to exercise their influence on the masses and to secure their support or, at 
least, tolerance. 
Second, I choose to focus on the concept of liberalism because of its importance in 
relation to modernizing policies. Until the end of the First World War and the spread of anti-
liberal ideas and regimes throughout Europe in 1920s-1930s and despite those regimes’ 
important differences, liberalism was the dominant paradigm for any political system that wanted 
to modernize itself. This made the various movements for constitutionalism, political 
representation and participation a common trend in the long 19
th
 century. This changed the same 
period that the nationalistic movement founded the Turkish republic. The Kemalist regime was 
one of the first examples in this trend towards authoritarianism in the inter-war period. The 
financial crisis of 1929, which further undermined the ideal of an economically and politically 
society, did not cause a pro-authoritarian change in the Kemalist regime and mainly reinforced 
preexisting tendencies. The main change that the crisis brought about was the recognition of the 
need for the masses to be ideologically indoctrinated and to be mobilized in the program of 
radical modernization. But the restricted authoritarian political regime, with the absence of 
opposing voices in the press and opposition parties and the supremacy of the executive, were 
products of the 1920s before totalitarianism became dominant in Europe. Thus, the suspicion 
towards the liberal ideal can be traced back to the resistance movement after WW1. This process 
implemented through the regime’s actions and their justification is the main aim of the present 
study. 
A definition of liberalism is necessary for any meaningful analysis. I pursue an eclectic 
approach in which the political systems of France and England, the monarchist and republican 
liberal alternatives, are my ‘indirect’ guides towards a conception of a ‘proper’ liberal political 
system. In this context, the stress on individual’s rights and obligations, the right of political 
participation in every echelon of power, the rule of law, the importance of electorate's 
representation by an assembly that legitimizes the actions of the executive branch , the separation 
of powers, the stress of individual in contrast to collective identities and a competitive political 
  
system appear as points of reference. In the economic sphere, the support of a free market with 
minimum intervention from the state in the economic activities and the relatively free movement 
of capital and goods at an interstate level are clearly characteristics of economic liberalism. But it 
is impossible to carry out an analysis of any society, including the Turkish one, without allowing 
peculiarities to exist. In other words, a strict and rigid use of those concepts would lead us to the 
conclusion that only England and France can claim a proper use of Liberalism as a political 
program, though some cases would excluded even these countries. 
In the last period of the Ottoman Empire, the opposition party against CUP made use the 
term ‘liberal’. It was known as ‘Liberal Union’ or ‘Liberal Entente’ in Europe although in 
Ottoman Turkish its name was ‘Hürriyet ve İtilâf Fırkası’, Freedom and Accord Party. It 
advocated a program of political decentralization and support of private initiative but their 
alliance with the Entente since 1919 delegitimized in the eyes of important segments of Ottoman 
society and marked the end of their political career. The association of this party with liberalism 
in general damaged term’s popularity in the country since then. But this was only one of the 
currents of liberalism in the late Ottoman Empire, and the existence of supporters of a more 
inclusive, open and competitive political regime among the nationalists since 1919 indicates its 
greater popularity. 
Another peculiarity that is extremely important in the Turkish context is the nature of 
Turkish elites and their growing support for centralization. The relative weakness of the Muslim 
bourgeoisie, political but economic as well, and the perceived opposition by religious adversaries 
towards radical modernization, forced the remaining pro-modernizing elites, officers, 
bureaucrats, intellectuals and some professional groups (e.g. doctors and lawyers,) to pursue a 
policy of a strong state and restricted freedom to non-state groups within civic society. 
Moreover, they concluded a tactical and strategic alliance with the elites in the countryside, 
mostly landowners, tribal leaders and local notables. This alliance was not always harmonious 
but it was based on the state’s support for the acquisition of the properties of non-Muslims by 
these social strata during WW1. This growing tendency towards centralization further reinforced 
the distrust towards the commercial and professional classes, despite being initially friendly 
  
towards the policy of radical and secular modernization. They also further limited the appeal of 
ideologies that advocated more respect to individual rights. 
In this study, I follow the turns and twists in the views, actions and justifications of 
Kemal, his associates and some of his opponents. In the 1930s, this group of people eventually 
became the dominant political current in Turkey and established a regime under the auspices of 
Kemalism, an ideology with eclectic references to an array of political ideals including 
liberalism, corporatism and others.  
In the first chapter, ‘The preparation for the overthrow of monarchy and the 
dissemination of ideas of popular sovereignty’, through the narratives of Halide’s Memoirs and 
Kemal’s Nutuk, I focus in the alliance of disparate political elements united only in their 
opposition against Entente and on how the supporters of a westernizing nationalist reformist 
movement obtained their prominent position in the nationalist movement. They had to fight 
against those who rejected Europe as the guide for a modern regime and advocated the formation 
of a state, compatible with modernity’s needs, along the lines of Bolshevism, the dynastic loyalty 
or the religion. The ‘westernizers’ won by spreading ideas of popular sovereignty opposed to the 
idea of a monarch ruling the country and depriving the nation of its legitimizing source of power. 
And they avoided any radical social reforms in order to preserve the social order and so as not to 
undermine their alliance with the conservative strata of local landowners and notables. The 
instrumental approach of Kemal and others to matters of ideology allowed them to retain certain 
aspects of continuity with the constitutional past but it did not confine them to a course that 
would not allow them to pursue policies of rupture in the future. And this continuity with the 
imperial past is strongly related with liberalism due to its prominent influence in the institutional 
and social reforms implemented in the Late Ottoman Empire. 
In the second chapter, ‘The Authoritarian Turn, The Division of the former First Group 
among Radicals and Liberals’ I use published researches on the Progressive Republican Party 
alongside the sources of the 1
st
 chapter to follow the last acts of this united westernizing 
nationalist movement and their division among liberals and radicals. In this period, from 1922 
until 1929, the alliance of different currents within the westernizers dissovled, after the 
  
establishment of a regime under the principles of national and popular sovereignty and the 
adoption of a constitution in 1924, alongside European liberal values and norms. The growing 
despotic tendencies of Kemal and his intention to launch a program of radical reforms without 
any concern for public sentiment sparked a reaction of other leaders from the nationalist 
movement. They agreed on the need these reforms to be implemented but disagreed on the speed 
and extent and advocated a more moderate approach given the masses’ hostility to a complete 
westernization of the country. The effective implementation of these reforms would demand a 
particularly strong executive with limited control from the assembly and minimal respect of 
individual freedoms and rights. These tendencies in RPP forced them to found a party and to 
publish a political manifesto that promoted a complete adoption of liberalism as ideal. Through 
this statement, they demanded the masses’ views for to the reforms to be respected and more 
freedom for the dissemination of opposing views though tolerance did not extend to reactionary 
and religious elements. The danger in this opposing party ruling the country and its common 
political origins with RPP, combined with the RPP’s eclectic relation with liberalism, illustrates 
that this ideal was not so alien in 1920s Turkey, contrary to claims in several historical studies.  
In the third chapter, ‘The Hybrid Nature of Kemalism in 1930s’, I focus on the 
transformation of the regime and the adoption of Kemalism as ideology for the country through 
Peker's analysis on the Turkish nationalist movement and other historical studies for 1930s 
Turkey. After an initial experiment with a tame opposition party in 1930, Kemal and his 
associates decided to expand their control beyond politics and to every other civic association. A 
unique ideology emerged through the party structures and the dissemination of specific ideas 
through these structures. This ideology, in which all the previous acts of the regime were 
incorporated and justified came to be known as Kemalism. Through its actions in 1930s, the 
analyses of Peker’s ideas and Gökalp’s corporatism and its comparison with other European anti-
liberal movements, I stress the hybrid nature of Kemalism, which allowed certain aspects of 
liberalism to survive. This allowed it to continue to function as a conceptual framework in 
Turkish politics until today and to take different shapes and forms during each period. One 
prominent example here is the transition in a multi-party regime in the 1940s with minimum 
changes at the institutional level.  
  
Overall, the ideological origins of the Turkish nationalist movement in 19th century post-
revolutionary Europe, and despite its increasing exclusion of other competing programs that 
culminated in the Kemalism of the 1930s, allowed it to retain eclectic influences of the political 
liberalism throughout the period. The most prominent case of those influences is that the regime 
retained a liberal and democratic façade in all its actions and all of its decisions were justified 
through a parliamentary majority alongside a typical respect of individual rights.
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1. The Preparation for the Overthrow of the Sultan and the 
Dissemination of Ideas of Popular Sovereignty, 1919-1922 
In the first chapter I investigate the influence of political liberalism in the national 
resistance movement against the Entente and, later on, the Sultan. The rise of this movement, 
which had a clear nationalist program from the beginning, faced several challenges from the 
outset. The response of Kemal and other actors to these challenges allow us to assess the 
influence of that period in the subsequent events that created the Turkish republic gaving its 
distinctive character at the ideological level. The main problems were the following; to secure 
the support of the masses for a new state entity against the Entente and the Sultan, to block any 
attempts by the Sultan to use his popular appeal to undermine the popularity of the dissident 
nationalists and to secure the broad coalition of disparate forces that were united against the 
Entente but with a limited consensus in any other area of politics. These demanded of Kemal not 
to adopt rigid ideological positions but to approach several matters in an instrumental fashion. 
But this instrumentalism had limits and it is these during the war years that I attempt to delineate 
with reference to the ideology of political liberalism.  
In the beginning, and up the move of the (or creation of a new) parliament in Ankara, the 
Committees for the Defense of the National Rights were transformed from non-state, civic 
organizations to a network from which a body of representatives emerged. They regarded 
themselves as representatives of the nation's will and advocated its independence from the 
Entente’s occupation forces. This change, which occurred from the spring of 1919 to the opening 
proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) in Ankara, is the first significant 
step towards the creation of a new state entity that was autonomous from Istanbul. The pressure 
that the nationalists exerted on the cabinet not to pursue a conciliatory policy towards the Entente 
is a prominent feature of the period. The initiative, although in the official Kemalist 
historiography is attributed to Kemal, cannot be traced back to to a single person and a single 
organizational network such as the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). The CUP took the 
initiative, but it had to ally itself with political forces that supported a considerably different 
political program, as it became apparent later on with the conflicts among the First and the 
Second group in TGNA, and to overcome their important political differences in order to 
10 
 
 
succeed in the non-dismemberment of Anatolia and Thrace. The narratives of Mustafa Kemal’s 
Nutuk and Halide Edip’s Turkish Ordeal suggest different approaches about the main questions 
of this complex period, such as the political legitimacy of the movement; the role of the 
Committee for the Defense of the National Rights in Thrace and Anatolia, and its relation with 
the government in Istanbul. In other words, how the dissident nationalist elites justified their 
disobedience to the Sultan, how they secured the masses’ support or intolerance for this 
‘mutiny’, and whether they had to create alternative political institutions to achieve those ends. 
Those events cannot be regarded as directly related to political liberalism, as an ideal for the 
formation of a modern nation-state. But this early phase set the foundation for a state that would 
uphold the principle of national and popular sovereignty, which is also a distinctive feature of 
liberal political systems as well.
1
 
This connection between the political project of the Nationalists and political liberalism 
was a constant theme in Kemal’s political thought, although it was not always clear from the 
beginning or at all times. It was expressed as the idea that sovereignty belongs unconditionally to 
the people, that it is indivisible and that it is expressed through people’s representatives. Before 
the creation of the TGNA in Ankara, the Committee for the Defense of the National Rights  
functioned as a civic association and pressure group with the backing of important generals and 
governors. Kemal argued that the network of those committees and its executive board in 
Ankara, that followed as a political program the proceedings of the congresses in Erzurum and 
Sivas and had him as its president, represented and was nation's voice. The nation was not able 
to express his will and needed this network of committees due to the constant delay in the 
declaration of new election, which finally took place at the end of 1919. Those theoretical 
concepts and principles were approached through an instrumentalism that was present in the 
political reality since the time of the Young Turks. Kemal was one of its prominent members 
since the beginning, although he never attained the level of political fame and prestige of its 
leaders, Enver Pasha, Cemal Pasha and Talat Pasha. In a recurring pattern throughout the period 
of the Young Turks, the Nationalists Movement and the rule of RPP, whenever there was a 
choice between, on the one hand, a strong executive and the implementation of a program of 
                                                 
1
         E. Hobsbawm, The Age of the Extremes, London: Abacus 1995 p. 110 
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rapid modernization and, on the other, a political system closer to a liberal democracy without 
the means to apply such a program, the leadership would side with the former.
2
  
The first act in this process was the increased autonomy of Kemal and other prestigious 
generals, such as Kazım Karabekir, towards Istanbul. Kemal kept silent on his appointment from 
Istanbul as Inspector General in Central and Northern Anatolia or on his contacts with anti-
Unionist politicians so as to become the minister of Defense immediately after the armistice. But, 
even from the first pages of Halide’s memoirs, it emerges that Kemal supported the closure of 
the parliament by the Sultan after the October 1918 armistice. This a clear indication that Halide 
shared the view that a fraction of the Young Turks came close to constitutionalism, which she 
takes as a sign of a truly democratic regime, in a more or less instrumental fashion.
3
 Even in Ali 
Kemal's circular in the summer of 1920, as minister of Interior in Damat Ferit’s cabinet, where  
the removal of Kemal’s duties from the army was announced, Kemal appears as an respected 
officer, with important patriotic (‘hamiyet’) activity.4 This reference illustrates that the 
government in Istanbul did not regard Kemal as a rebel in relation to the Sultan but as a potential 
ally in the future and they aimed to force Kemal to obey the directives from Istanbul. 
Furthermore, it shows Istanbul’s tactic towards pro-nationalist officers, through which it tried to 
tighten its control over them without considering all of their patriotic activities as actions against 
government policies.
5
 Kemal’s appointment as Inspector general in Anatolia and Karabekir’s 
retention of his post as military commander of the army in the East were results of this forced 
alliance. Kemal’s resignation from the army served a similar purpose; to minimize the conflicts 
with Istanbul.
6
 Being a civilian, without any official bonds with the government allowed him to 
have more room to maneuvers without seeming to be an officer who defies direct orders from his 
superiors, although the danger of losing any legitimate claims to lead the nationalist movement 
was present. 
                                                 
2
  E. J. Zurcher ‘Young Turks, Ottoman Muslims and Turkish Nationalists’ Pp. 172-173, 176 in K. 
Karpat (ed.), Ottoman Past and Today’s Turkey, Boston: Brill 2000  
3
  Halide Edin (Adıvar), The Turkish Ordeal, New York: 1928 Pp. 12,14 
4
  Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1981 p. 49 
5
  D. A. Rustow ‘The Army and the Founding of the Turkish Republic’ p. 171-172 in E. J. Zurcher 
and T. Atabaki (eds.), Men of Order; Authoritarian Modernization under Ataturk and Reza Shah, London: I. B. 
Tauris 2010  
6
  İsmet Giritli, Fifty Years of Turkish Political Development 1919-1969, Istanbul: 1969 p. 7 
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Moreover, the consent for the future policy of the nationalist movement among its 
members, mainly officers in this first period, was not secure. First of all, Kemal recognized the 
tedious task of securing popular and, mostly, the elite’s support for his policy of disobedience 
towards the Sultan. The people, the army and the intellectuals, who regarded the sultanate as the 
supreme authority in the country, were not ready for a direct confrontation with the government 
in Istanbul and the situation demanded a gradual unfolding of his intended policy.
7
 Although it is 
not possible to know exactly when Kemal decided to pursue the foundation of a republic in the 
place of a dynastic empire, the need to be tactful of this plan until his position as the supreme 
leader of the nationalist movement was secure, forced him to be in a constant bargain towards 
disparate forces with a large spectrum of political plans.
8
 This was a product of the alliance 
between the bureaucratic and army elite with local notables, landowners, tribal leaders and a part 
of the Muslim bourgeoisie, who had increased their wealth and social status through the 
appropriation of Christian properties and commercial activities since WW1.
9
 All these forces 
were united in the resistance regarding the partition of Ottoman land, but they did not agree in 
the means of resistance and the appropriate form of government in the future.  
Probably the most important factor in the early years was Kazım Karabekir, one of the 
leaders of the liberal opposition against RPP later on. He was the commander of the last 
relatively intact and combat-effective ottoman military force. Being in the East, the distance 
from Istanbul and the lack of railway connection allowed him to have a certain amount of 
autonomy for the implementation of his policies. The main obstacle was two British divisions in 
Caucasus which could force the incorporation of the six eastern Provinces in the newly founded 
Armenia in Caucasus. He was also a well-known, experienced, nationalist officer who was ready 
to use all the available, military and national, means to prevent this incorporation. Nevertheless, 
he did not wish to establish his personal rule in the area and advocated a policy of continuity 
with the previous period and moderate opposition towards the Sultan. His decision not to arrest 
Kemal, during the Erzurum congress and to support Kemal in his bid of the Representatives’ 
Committee for the Committees for the Defense of the national Rights was essential.
10
 The 
                                                 
7
  Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1981 Pp. 15,17 
8
  Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1981 Pp. 21,23 
9
  Ç. Keyder, State and in Turkey, London: Verso 1987 and S. Mardin, The Center Periphery 
Relations; A Key to Turkish Politics, Daedalus vol. 102 n. 1, 1973, p. 40   
10
  Halide Edin (Adıvar), The Turkish Ordeal, New York: 1928 p. 45  
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lengthy telegrams of Karabekir in Kemal’s Nutuk, besides legitimizing Kemal’s decision to 
arrest him in 1926, illustrate clearly his political importance for the Nationalists’ movement.11     
Ideas about active resistance against the possible dismemberment of Anatolia, 
disobedience to the Sultan’s conciliatory policies towards the Entente, by using the nation as the 
supreme source for political authority, first emerged in the statements of the new movement, the 
Amasya circular, and the proceedings of the Erzurum and Sivas congresses.  
Among the 8 points of the Amasya circular
12
, the fourth point is the more interesting. By 
using the argument on the lack of legitimacy of the Istanbul government due to its disrespect of 
the nation’s will which did not accept Entente’s plans, it advocated the creation of a national 
council or committee, which would secure the expression of the national will, free from any 
foreign influences. The term used for this organ, ‘heyet-i milliye’ has the same ambiguity of all 
the movements and institutions that used the term millet and milliyet. Although the term was 
using extensively in the nationalistic literature to describe the new imagined community, it still 
had some of its religious connotations that strengthened its appeal to the religious lower classes 
of Anatolia and made the new collective identity much more concrete with reference to the social 
reality of the people.
13
 In any case, this national council was the first expression of a political 
authority in contrast with that of Istanbul, although the exact nature of this organization vis-à-vis 
Istanbul remained deliberately vague in the text. Refet (Bele), commander of the army in Ankara 
and prominent nationalist, was initially reluctant to sign a document which advocated the 
creation of a temporary government in Anatolia. Only after pressure from Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), 
commander of the army in Central Anatolia and important associate of Kemal in the first period 
of the nationalist movement, Refet withdrew his objections.
14
 Further along, a tension between 
Kemal’s initiative for a congress in Sivas, and Karabekir’s in Erzurum, is indirectly described, 
due to Kemal’s need to clarify that the two conferences were not antagonistic to each other and 
that the one in Sivas would incorporate Erzurum’s decisions and executive organ. 
                                                 
11
  Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1981 in general and H. Adak ‘National Myths and Self-
Na(rra)tions’ in The South Atlantic Quarterly 102:2/3, Spring/Summer 2003 
12
  Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1981 p. 43 
13
  U. Uzak, Islam and Secularism in Turkey, London: I. B. Tauris 2010 p. 13, Ç. Keyder, State and 
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227 
14
  Halide Edin (Adıvar), The Turkish Ordeal, New York: 1928 p. 43 
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The proceeding of Erzurum and Sivas congresses did not change considerably the 
program of the nationalists. In the Erzurum
15
, they set forth their demand for respect of the 
national rights from Istanbul’s government. Failing that, a temporary government (‘muvakkat’ 
hükümet) would be formed in Anatolia. The temporariness of the new organ is been supported by 
Halide as well while she stressed that it would abide by the law of the Sultan. The initiative did 
not belong exclusively to Kemal, who advocated for a central conference in Sivas but, among 
others, to Karabekir as well, who needed it as a legal pretext for his actions.
16
 The danger of 
incorporation of the Six Eastern provinces in the new Armenian state with the help of the two 
British divisions demanded of Karabekir to pursue a policy of disobedience and later on, active 
resistance to the Entente’s demands. In the beginning, he used troops of irregulars to stop the 
disarmament of the Ottoman army in the East, while those weapons were being transferred to the 
Armenian army, and to keep these in the hands of the nationalists.  
In Sivas, the nationalists further elaborated this point by including the active resistance 
towards the Armenian, Greek and Entente’s forces in their demands from Istanbul.17 The 
tensions between factions of the former CUP movement are described by Halide, who mentions 
Kemal’s objection against Mehmet Cavit Bey's participation as representative of the nationalists 
in Istanbul to the Sivas congress.
18
  
In the congresses proceedings, the possibility of a mandate was not ruled out completely, 
although it was mentioned only indirectly as technical, economic and political help that could be 
accepted by any power without any territorial ambitions against ‘Turkey’.19 This point is 
particularly interesting for Kemal and Halide’s counter-narratives. Kemal mentioned Halide in 
his Speech only as one of the advocates of this solution and indirectly he also delegitimized her 
husband Dr. Adnan (Adıvar), an important nationalist politician and member of the liberal 
fraction in the movement. Nevertheless in her memoirs, their importance and closeness to the 
leadership is clear. In Kemal’s narrative, the possibility of an American mandate would violate 
the inviolable principle of popular sovereignty and no government with legitimacy from an 
elected parliament could coexist with a mandate. But Bekir Sami Bey and Halide Edip regarded 
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it as a viable alternative due to Wilson’s recognition of the national rights of the Turks, the moral 
prestige of USA in matters of foreign policy and the belief that America would provide guidance 
for the necessary reforms of Turkey. Moreover, Bekir Sami argued that the Americans would 
respect the territorial integrity of the empire and the dynastic rights of the sultan alongside the 
chance the ottomans to pursue an (relatively) autonomous foreign policy.
20
  
 When it was clear that the congress in Sivas would take place, the government of Damat 
Ferit Pasha decided to stop the congress in Sivas and to arrest the representatives who were 
present. This was an important moment for the nationalist movement. They increased their 
criticism against the cabinet, by leaving the Sultan temporarily outside, and carried out acts of 
disobedience towards the government by controlling the communication between the capital and 
Anatolian cities.
21
 Moreover, Kemal felt the need to reassure the public that the state had 
continuity, the laws and power of the Sultan (‘Padişah Hazretleri Adına’) were still valid and the 
life, property, honor and all of the peoples’ rıghts would be respected because of their origins or 
religion. (‘Halkın canı, malı, ırzı ve her türlü hakları güven altında bulundurulacaktır’)22 In 
Kemal’s contacts with Abdül Kerim Pasha, a liaison between the opposing forces, he declared 
the power of the government to be arbitrary due to its function as an obstacle between the nation 
and the Sultan. In cases such as these the nation had the right to carry out acts of political 
disobedience.
 23
  
The Sultan appointed a new cabinet that was more friendly with the nationalists in 
Anatolia, and soon elections were declared. In the elections, the various branches of the 
Committee for the Defense of the national Rights made sure that their candidates would be 
elected, or chosen among the local elites, and that a pro-nationalist parliamentarian majority 
would control the government. Their participation in the elections indicated that the nationalist 
cadres were still saw Istanbul as the appropriate space for their political battle.
24
 The control of 
the majority’s from Kemal, who had made Ankara as base for his operations, was not certain. 
His attempts to have the parliament convened in Ankara or to get himself elected as president of 
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the parliament in order to have the right to call for the convention of the parliament in other 
places, were unsuccessful. Although the parliament adopted the National Pact, a document that 
incorporated all the nationalists’ demands until then, it also gave a confidence vote to Sultan’s 
government, by ignoring Kemal’s request to withdraw its support as a protest for Entente’s 
interference in internal politics.
25
 
The main point of conflict with his associates in Anatolia was the future role of the 
Representatives’ committee in Ankara, now that the nation’s will was expressed through the 
parliament. In the beginning he had reassured them that when this would take place, he would 
convene a new general congress in order for its activity to adjust to the new conditions. 
Nevertheless, he did not keep his word and continued pressing the government and the 
parliament to pursue policies according to the nationalists’ program. An example of this was the 
telegraph to the Sultan for choosing the ‘right person’ as Grand Vizier.26 In this text, he warned 
the Sultan that if he did not comply with the will of the ‘nation’, he would be responsible for the 
disobedience of the nation to his orders, a profound situation in the history of the empire.
27
 
His policy of pressure was not supported by everybody. Kazım Karabekir though it was a 
mistake for the Representatives committee to continue its activities and to represent the nation’s 
will, now that a new parliament had convened and the government had to obtain a confidence 
vote. As the leader of the nationalists in the parliament, if Rauf (Orbay) consider it necessary, 
Kemal and the rest of the members in the Representatives’ committee had to comply. Moreover, 
he assured Kemal that the front against the Greek forces in Aydin would continue to operate with 
the responsibility of the army and the commanders of national forces (bands of irregulars).
28
  
The occupation of Istanbul by the Entente offered invaluable service to the more radical 
nationalists who advocated a rupture with the monarchy. But even in these conditions it was only 
much later that the ideas of a rupture gained widespread support among the elite and the 
deputies. Kemal’s move to call the deputies, who had escaped the arrest by Entente, to join him 
in Ankara and a new representative body to be formed, was met with support by important 
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elements in the movement. His language in those statements referred to the violation of the 
national sovereignty, the need for a ‘holy war’ in order for the Caliph to be freed from the 
foreign control. He also accused the Western states of hypocrisy, because they did not respect the 
individual’s rights and liberties in Turkey as they did in their own countries. The new 
governmental body would have the name of ‘Council with Emergency Powers’ (‘Salâhiyeti 
fevkalâdeye malik bir meclis’), it would abide by the laws of the Ottoman Empire. The 
replacements of deputies that have been arrested would emerge through elections from the 
nationalist cadres and local elites (probably without the masses’ participation in these 
procedures). Halide and the parliament speaker in Istanbul Celalettin Arif Bey supported his 
ideas, a sign of the relatively widespread appeal of his initiative. Due to his legal background, 
Celalettin Arif was inclined to support this radical act through references to the constitution. 
Because the Ottoman constitution did not have provisions for this case he referred to the French 
constitution which foresaw that the French parliament if disbanded illegally or attacked, had the 
right to re-assemble in a safe place with the surviving members. The vacant deputyships would 
be replaced through elections from the municipal and regional (sancak) councils.
29
 
The formation of a new government which would impose its control on the ottoman 
territory was the next subject for the newly formed assembly, the ‘Turkish Grand National 
Assembly’ or TGNA. In Kemal’s narration, this was a relatively simple procedure although he 
states that when, later on, the deputies understood the practical implications of those decisions, 
the opposition within the assembly increased. He achieved, without mentioning the details from 
the debates, the incorporation of executive and legislative branches in the TGNA, and made the 
president of Assembly into the president of the Governmental Committee as well. This principle, 
expressed as ‘Unity of Powers’, was also signified because of the name that was used for the 
cabinet. Instead of the ottoman Turkish term for minister, ‘nazır’, the term ‘vekil’ was used, 
which meant commissar, a term with strong Bolsheviks connotations. The sensitive matter of the 
TGNA’s relationship with the Sultan was not clarified and its solution was postponed because 
the deputies did not want their acts not to appear as a revolution against the sultanate, although 
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any reference to the temporary nature of the new institutions, as was the case in previous public 
statements, was absent.
30
 
For Halide, and probably for the politicians that later on formed the PRP, the matter was 
of critical importance, and she refers to the debates extensively. It is obvious that she, among 
others, supported Celalettin Arif Bey’s suggestion for a transition governmental body, which 
would resemble a Republican one, and it would have a President who would function as a regent 
for the absent monarch. The powers would be divided between the assembly keeping charge of 
the legislative and a cabinet of ministers that would exercise the executive. This was opposed 
strongly by Kemal. Through the motto ‘power is indivisible and belongs solely to the people’ he 
demanded all the powers to be founded by the Assembly. Although the practical differences 
might appear insignificant, the election of a governmental committee by the parliament, which 
committee was actually exercising the executive, reduced its control from the assembly. The 
commissars, as they were called, were elected individually by it and no collective responsibility 
existed for the cabinet, its president, or the president of the assembly who presided over the 
cabinet as well. This hybrid model allowed Kemal to avoid responsibility for any failures of his 
cabinet. Moreover, he secured the support of opponents for a liberal democracy, including pro-
Bolshevik and religious elements, in order to be elected president of TGNA. The adversaries of a 
more rational pro-western governmental body choose to support Kemal due to the need for the 
new assembly to gain legitimacy as a bearer of the national will as fast as possible. Moreover, 
the political inexperience of the new deputies in constitutional and institutional matters was 
another factor in the adoption of this model.
31
  
One of the first signs of tensions between Kemal and his first collaborators in Anatolia, 
Refet (Bele) and Ali Fuat (Cebesoy) was their opposition to the idea of İsmet (İnönü) becoming 
Chief of General Staff. That this conflict manifested itself not as a constitutional or political 
question, but regarding the position of the highest military authority in the (new) state illustrates 
the main issues for which a political fight could emerge and the instrumental fashion in which 
more ideological matters were approached by both sides.
32
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The Judicial branch in this new scheme was exercised by the Independence Tribunals, 
which was formed in September of 1920, and allowed deputies to judge cases of desertion and 
high treason. Their incumbency was limited and for most of the war they were under the strict 
control of the assembly.
33
  
From the autumn of 1920 differences among the deputies started to emerge, exacerbated 
by the discussions in the assembly on the ‘Law of Fundamental Organization’ (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye 
Kanunu), that would regulate important matters in the new state entity. Halide used the scheme 
of supporters of the Western Ideal and of the Eastern Ideal alongside the ‘Independents’. Kemal 
avoided this distinction, perhaps because of his instrumental approach to those differences, 
although he referred to the existence of opposition.  
For Halide, who put herself among the supporters of the Western Ideal, Westernism was 
a political program which advocated policies of modernization, without the radical Jacobin 
overtones of the future Kemalists, in a liberal political system as a constitutional monarchy or as 
a republic. The respect of individual freedoms and rights combined with the conservatism of the 
masses made it necessary for those modernizing changes to be moderate, gradual and with a 
strong sense of continuity with the past but without losing the aim of creating a modern, western 
like, country. Those elements, which included notable members of the nationalists movement 
which later founder RPP, were extremely concerned to prevent Kemal from increasing his share 
of power, although they ultimately failed in this task. Nevertheless, the popularity of these ideas 
among the lower strata of the political elite, such as middle-range officers, local notables, leaders 
of bands of irregulars was limited due to the war that they had to undertake against western 
imperialism.
34
  
The supporters of the Eastern ideal, known also as ‘Second Group’ (İkinci Grup) were 
much less homogeneous in their ranks and were relatively less experienced. The influence of the 
Bolshevik revolution was considerable among them, not so much due to the appeal of its socialist 
future and its radical social, economic and political reforms, but because of its effectiveness in 
defying the western powers and its ability to impose another vision in Russia. This functioned as 
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a motive among the nationalists to reject Europe as a model and to look for an original, 
indigenous in the East, model compatible with the needs of modernity. In September 1920, the 
parliament’s declaration ‘the people in Turkey are under the oppression of capitalism and 
imperialism and that it would free them from this threat’ was indicative of the prevalent anti-
westernism among the deputies.
35
 Nevertheless, they never made explicit satisfyingly how the 
necessary modernization of a poor and backward country was to take place. Among their ranks 
were pro-socialists, leaders of irregular bands which despised any strong state authority and  
wanted to secure their power in areas under their control, and religious elements which saw the 
(civil) war as an opportunity to establish the democracy that existed in the first years of the 
caliphate under Mohammed. For all these reasons, they never had a concrete political program 
and they could not challenge Kemal’s leadership.36 
Kemal used these divisions to secure his dominance in the parliament. He sided with the 
‘Easterners’ in order for a hybrid political system to be adopted, with no constitutional checks for 
the executive and he sided with the Westerners so that no radical, political and social reforms to 
be implemented that would undermine the fragile alliance between this variety of political forces. 
The removal of Nazım Bey from the ministry of Interior and the conflict with Erzurum for the 
appointment of a new governor in the area were signs of this attitude. Moreover, he used these 
events to increase his control in the cabinet by securing the right to propose his own candidates 
for the ministries in the assembly.
37
  
Another indicative event for Kemal’s role between the two fraction (always according to 
Halide’s analysis), was the suggestion of Kazım Karabekir for the creation of a second body of 
deputies, with strong resemblance of a senate, which would be elected among the higher stratums 
of the society with adequate education and service for the state. It would secure the continuity of 
the governmental policies and it would provide political and technical expertise and guidance to 
the main body of the deputies who represented a wider spectrum of stratums This might also 
include people with no strong qualifications for ruling a country. Kemal turned down his 
suggestion. He considered it a source of divisions and conflicts for the assembly, it was violating 
the principle of indivisibility of power and required a third institution which would be an 
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arbitrator between those two bodies. In his response to Kazım he also implied that Kazım 
indirectly was asking the Sultan to assume the role of the arbitrator.
38
 
The adoption of the ‘Law of Fundamental Organization’ in 1921 and the appointment of 
Kemal as supreme commander of the army consolidated his position as the head of the resistance 
movement and contributed to the final vinctory against the Greek army in August of 1922. Its 
adoption was a major victory for Kemal because he succeeded incorporating in the text all the 
previous decisions of the assembly that had allowed him to control it. The lack of references in 
its relation with the Sultanate allowed him to keep both the pro-monarchical and republican 
forces in a political alliance. Moreover, he had the legal pretext not to accept any compromise 
with the government in Istanbul and to demand that the TGNA be the only government that 
could decide for the end of the war. But the sense of continuity between the previous 
governments in Istanbul and the one in Ankara was apparent by the last point in the text, where it 
declares that all the articles of the previous constitution which did not violate the new one were 
still in effect. (‘Kanun-ı Esasinin işbu mevat ile tearuz etmiyen ahklami kemakan 
mer’iyülicradır’)39 The new constitution further increased the conflicts in the assembly, and it 
had become difficult to secure a majority. This forced him to found the Defense for the National 
Rights in Thrace and Anatolia party, and its parliamentarian group. Almost all the deputies 
participated in it. The opposition emerged within its parliamentarian group and was named as the 
second group in contrast with the group of deputies which was supporting Kemal’s leadership, 
named as first group retrospectively.
40
  
In those moves, Karabekir tried to persuade Kemal to adopt a more moderate stance, not 
to push forward his ideal for a republican political system and to keep it as the party’s political 
program due to the hostility of the masses to this prospect. Moreover, he demanded important 
political and military actors to be consulted before those changes were to take place. His last 
point was that Kemal had to refrain from a direct involvement in the political conflicts and not to 
support any of the parliamentarian groups. Kemal responded to his complaints by arguing that 
the constitution did not define the system of government. Moreover, he rejected the idea of 
negotiating the reforms with other actors, apart from the deputies, as a violation of the populist 
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principle. Lastly, he considered essential for the president to participate in a political group 
because the executive power was exercised by the assembly as well, and the parliament did not 
function only as a constitutional check to the executive power of the government, as was the  
case in the past.
41
 The populist principle, began emerging in Kemal’s statements during the 
debates for the constitution. Its democratic connotations notwithstanding, it was a tool for mass 
mobilization against foreign occupation and the imperial bureaucracy. In the future, and with its 
further clarification, it would play the role of securing the support of the lower classes for the 
new regime.
42
  
 
In the period between 1919 and 1922 the first characteristics of the future Turkish 
republic started to emerge, through the acts and decisions of a group of dissident nationalist elites 
who sought legitimacy as a governmental body vis-à-vis the Sultan’s cabinets. The National 
resistance movement’s first success was that it gained legitimacy as a different state entity, in 
direct conflict with the Entente’s forces and the Sultan in Istanbul. This legitimacy secured the 
popularity of laicism and republicanism in the future. The masses accepted that a government 
should be elected from the people and decide according to the nation’s interests without the 
people and their government having to obey a metaphysical, dynastic power. Although this was 
not fully implemented until 1922, the lack of opposition for the abolishment of the sultanate in 
1922 was due to the success of a group of officers and politicians who dared to revolt against the 
Sultan and defeated the winners of WW1. 
Furthermore, the nationalist leadership and Kemal kept a fragile balance among political 
forces with completely different programs. They prevented the establishment an anti-western 
pro-Bolshevik regime with a radical program of social, economic and cultural reforms although 
Kemal used their support in order to counter-balance the supporters of a western-like regime and 
to secure a policy of fierce opposition towards Istanbul.  
The supporters of a more rational liberal regime, called 'Westerners' by Halide, with 
references to European, monarchic or republican, regimes were never strong enough to 
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dominate, despite their incumbencies in important positions in the state and the army due to their 
political experience. Kemal used them stress the continuity of the new entity with the past 
through the provisions that most of the Sultan’s laws, alongside the individual liberties and 
rights, would be respected. The role of the Sultan was not clarified and it was theoretically still 
possible for the Sultan to remain the head of the state, although with only nominal power in his 
hands. And this vagueness allowed conservative, religious elements to also support the 
nationalists, in the project of liberating the captive Sultan. 
But the program of the westerners was never fully implemented. They wanted the new 
state entity to resemble the constitutional regime in Istanbul and to be shaped along the lines of 
liberal democracies. This was the reason they proposed the following: a) a two-chamber 
parliament to be established, where the second would function as a senate and secure the 
continuity of state policies and stop any inappropriate reforms initiating in the political 
inexperience of the deputies due to the universal suffrage, b) a constitutional regime with a 
president acting as regent until the Sultan to be free from any foreign influences c) the head of 
the Ankara’s government should not to participate in party politics and must act as an impartial 
arbitrator, imitating the Sultan’s stance towards party politics in the past. Their concern for the 
concentration of power in the hands of Kemal made them despise the ultra-democratic character 
of the regime such as the lack of constitutional checks for the executive and collective 
responsibility for the cabinet. 
The heritage of Kemal’s leadership during the national resistance movement allowed him 
to become the indisputable leader of the Turkish republic. The ‘hybrid ideological nature of the 
regime’ took shape through Kemal’s skillful alliance with such disparate political forces during 
the war years and the need to secure their support in the non-dismemberment of Anatolia. 
24 
 
 
 
2. The Authoritarian Turn; The division of the former First Group among 
Radicals and Liberals, 1922-1930 
After the victory against the Greek army in September of 1922 the broad alliance of 
various political forces against the foreign invasion, came apart. In the end of this process, after 
the Izmir trials in 1926, Kemal and his followers became the dominant political power in the 
country. 
 For my analysis of the period I use the scheme of radicals vis-à-vis liberals, although 
moderates would have also been suitable. I choose liberal to refer to the opposition of prominent 
nationalist generals towards Kemal’s despotic tendencies, due to their decision in 1924 to form a 
party and to publish a liberal political manifesto as a differentiating move towards RPP. It is not 
possible to be known if they were sincere supporters of liberalism, but their acts and statements 
since the war years show a relative consistency for a more open and inclusive regime. They 
despised the concentration of power in the hands of Kemal and considered essential to exist 
political freedom among the reformist westernizing forces, a political identity they considered 
sharing with their former associates. So, the name ‘liberal’ is being applied retrospectively in this 
group of politicians, although until 1924 they were part of the same party with Kemal and 
supported most of RPP’s decisions.  
Their similarities with Kemal and his followers were apparent. Both of those currents had 
in their ranks ex-Unionists although they avoided stressing their links with CUP.
43
 The political 
heritage of CUP was fundamental in their alliance and in their common elitist approach in 
politics. They recognized the immaturity of the masses and lack of political training in taking the 
right decisions for the future. This demanded a paternalist regime alongside a strong centralized 
state to impose the necessary reforms.
44
 Their main point of difference was the speed with which 
these reforms had to be imposed and not their nature, between the Liberal’s ‘ıslahat’ (reform) 
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and the Radicals’ ‘inkılap’ (revolution).45 In a sense, this elitism could be part of a corporatist or 
a liberal ideology, due to the inherent aristocratic and oligarchic tendencies of both ideologies. 
Corporatism, as I analyse it in the 3
rd
 chapter, emerged as an answer in the encounter of 
liberalism with mass politics and the destabilizing effects of industrialization regarding social 
order. The tendency for a more inclusive political regime from the liberals is present in Halide’s 
thought who recognized the potential dangers of this elitism which could end up as an 
‘unpatriotic’ notion because not everybody had the right to influence the future of the country. It 
could also lead to a party dictatorship in which the particular interests of party cadres would 
replace the national interest.
46
  
The term ‘radical’ for Kemal, his associates and most of the members of RPP is not the 
most accurate for a variety of reasons. First of all, there were several moderate politicians in the 
party, such as Fethi (Okyar), with significant similarities with the liberal opposition, and Celal 
(Bayar), a supporter of the authoritative regime at the political level with a much more liberal 
financial policy and future leader of the Democratic Party (DP) in the 1940s. Furthermore, 
Kemal’s approach to matters of ideology allowed him to move beyond already established 
patterns, although certain principles were constant in his thought. But, especially in 1920s, his 
decision to bring about a total breakt with Turkey’s imperial past is one reason to describe him 
and his associates as radical. The term Kemalism would demand an extensive analysis, 
something that is possible before the ideological clarification of the regime in 1930s.  
So in this chapter, I focus in this division of the westernizing nationalist movement 
among liberals and radicals. The ways which Kemal's opponents choose to criticize him and his 
reaction, gave rise to a political battle that had as its central issue the amount of inclusiveness of 
the new political system and the speed in which the necessary reforms had to be implemented. 
The adoption of liberalism from Kemal’s opponents allows us illuminating its contribution in 
1920s Turkey in both sides of political spectrum.   
In the period from 09/1922, when the total win against the Greek forces took places, until 
the elections of 1923, the First Group secured its complete dominance against the opposition. 
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This dominance became easier through the indirect electoral system, which allowed Kemal and 
its associates to hand-pick the candidates on the basis of their support of Westernization. The 
domination of Westernization was further facilitated through the support of notable intellectuals. 
Among those intellectuals the most prominent was Zıya Gökalp, famous sociologist and 
nationalist theoretician with strong opinions about the future of the new state in a corporatist, 
anti-liberal, capitalist direction.
 47
 
The end of the war against the Greeks brought to an end the exceptional powers of 
Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) and the government under the premiership of Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay) 
demanded a more prominent role. Since 1921 Kemal, İsmet, as the general commander of the 
western front and Chief of General Staff, Fevzi (Çakmak), as the second Chief of General Staff, 
and Kâzım Fikri (Özalp), as minster of National Defense, had been running the country with 
minimum control from the TGNA and the government. Kemal’s call to the prominent Generals 
Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), İbrahim Refet (Bele) and Musa Kâzım Karabekir, to participate in the 
liberation of İzmir and the celebrations for the victory against the Greeks, shows Kemal’s 
intention to include them in the post-war new order.
48
  
Those two groups of prominent politicians and generals would form the two blocks of 
radicals and liberals that dominated the political landscape until 1926. The rising tensions among 
them is depicted in two different events: In a meeting with Kemal, Ali Fuat attempted to discover 
who the new trusted associates of Kemal were, described as ‘Apostles’, and Halide described his 
followers as ‘desperados’, authorized to undermine the profile of his opponents in the nationalist 
movement by spreading false rumors and information.
49
 
After the armistice of Mudanya, among the Entente and the government of TGNA, as  
Ankara's government was called, the Entente invited the governments of both Ankara and the 
Sultan to participate in the peace talks. This secured TGNA’s support for the abolishment of the 
Sultanate, while the Caliphate survived for 18 more months, and sealed the fate of the last 
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Ottoman cabinet under Ahmet Tevfik (Okday)’s premiership.50 The support of the Liberals was 
not unconditional although they chose not to object. Halide regarded the last Ottoman cabinet as 
being sincerely pro-nationalist with considerable contribution in the win of the nationalists. 
Furthermore, she mentions the alternative choice of merging the two bodies and Kemal 
becoming the prime minister under the nominal rule of the Sultan.
51
 After the abolition, Kemal 
toured western Anatolia to investigate the public’s views and most of the questions concerned 
the relation between the new government and its principle of national sovereignty with the new 
Caliph in Istanbul.
52
 
İsmet’s appointment as minister of Foreign Affairs and head in the peace talks in 
Lausanne was another source of resentment due to Rauf’s intention to head the delegation and 
İsmet to be in charge only for the military affairs.53 İsmet’s decision to handle with relative 
freedom the guidelines of Rauf’s government and to adopt a conciliatory stance on the issue of 
the Greek compensations so as to secure desirable results on other fronts provoked the fierce 
reaction of Rauf
54
 who attempted to delegitimize Inonu’s position and to force him to resign. The 
use of public support for a tenacious stance would allow him to head the delegation and to 
maximize the gains from the looming peace treaty.
55
 The criticism did not come only from the 
cabinet but also from the opposition in the Assembly because the prerogatives of the National 
Pact demanded western Thrace and the Aegean islands to be part of the country. Kemal 
engineered election in the summer of 1923 in order to secure the approval of the peace treaty by 
excluding the Second Group from the new Assembly.
56
 İsmet’s success in Lausanne forced the 
cabinet to send him a congratulatory telegraph though they stressed their contribution in the win 
and played down İsmet’s involvement.57 
Nevertheless, the Liberals supported Kemal’s moves for the 1923 elections in order for 
the second group to be excluded from the next assembly and subscribed the Nine Principles, the 
program of the nationalists in the new assembly, in which a new party would be formed as 
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well.
58
 Also, the amendment of the High Treason Law, which since the spring of 1920 onwards 
made it illegal for anybody to advocate the return of the Sultan and to doubt the legitimacy of 
TGNA’s decisions, excluded important political forces in the country such as the supporters of 
the ancient regime and the Islamists. Contrary to these acts, in one of the attempts from the 
Second Group to block the re-election of Kemal in the coming elections of 1923, Kemal depicted 
Dr. Adnan, as vice-president of the TGNA, to facilitate their moves in the parliament.
59
  
The principles of laicism and nationalism were clarified in the text of ‘Nine Principles’60 
as the lack of authority that a monarch has to decide for the future of the country. The assembly 
would be the supreme and sole representative of the national will and the form of government 
was considered permanent and immutable. Kemal in his Speech described the aims of the 
nationalist movement, in contrast with Ottomanism, as the creation of a humanitarian state 
(‘insani bir devlet’) where its citizens could live under complete equality and brotherhood.61 The 
vagueness of their program and the lack of references for the future reforms was criticized by 
Halide and other Liberals and was considered to be one of the reasons for the minimum 
homogeneity among the deputies in the new assembly.
62
 Kemal defended it as a necessary 
tactical move because if all the future reforms were laid down it would have provoked the 
reaction of its opponents.
63
 The guide for the Liberals’ support maybe was originating in the 
previous example of CUP where a plurality of fractions existed with disparate views in various 
matters. 
İsmet’s success and his strained relation with Rauf, forced the latter to resign and to be 
replaced by Ali Fethi (Okyar), an old associate of Kemal with moderate liberal views. This 
choice and Kemal’s pressure to Ali Fuat to remain vice-president of TGNA indicate his will not 
to push the Liberal’s out of the party although the key positions in the state machine were in the 
hands of the radicals.
 64
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The first event that almost forced them out of the newly founded RPP was the declaration 
of the Republic in October 1923. A year before, Kemal had clarified the motto since the years of 
resistance, ‘Biz bize benzeriz’ as a form of government which did not resemble the western 
republics or other systems and was created according to the needs of the Turkish nation.
65
 
Nevertheless, ideas for abolition of the Caliphate and declaration of the Republic had been 
circulated in the press since the spring.
66
 Kemal took advantage of the Liberal’s absence from 
Ankara and created a governmental crisis by considering the rejection of his candidate for the 
vice-presidency of TGNA as a vote of no-confidence. In the party parliamentary sitting his more 
radical followers demanded the crisis to be resolved by entrusting the formation of a government 
to a powerful, capable person, implying Kemal himself. Kemal accepted their proposal, 
presented the necessary constitutional amendments in the assembly and the Republic was 
declared taking any opposition by surprise.
67
 Their only attempt had been to stop the party sitting 
and the issue to be discussed extensively in the assembly.
68
 
But, this provoked extensive criticism by Rauf and the Istanbul press which was shifting 
more and more in the opposition.
69
 Rauf in his interviews in Tanin and Tevhid-i Efkar criticized 
fiercely Kemal for authoritarian tendencies and hints of personal rule through statements of 
disbelief that the political change would further strenghen the democratic credential of the 
national sovereignty’s regime.70 Furthermore, such radical and hasty changes in the form of the 
government were considered inappropriate without extensive talks among all the political leaders 
in the country. It was a sign of the irresponsibility of the country’s leadership and a violation of 
the national sovereignty.
 71
  
Kemal responded by casting doubts on the sincerity of their belief in the Republic and 
argued that they were in alliance with religious reactionaries in order to restore the ancient 
regime. His concerns on the subversive acts of religious reactionaries began in the winter of 
1922-1923, when they had asked the creation of an Islamic constitutional monarchy in which the 
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national assembly would have the role of an advising body for the Caliph.
72
 Kemal reported that 
in several occasions Rauf was against the abolition of the Caliphate, the responsibilities of the 
head of the state to be strengthened implying, according to Kemal, the Caliph to undertake this 
role instead of the Republic to be declared.
73
 Rauf, moreover, argued that the governmental form 
of national sovereignty, as it was described in the 1921 constitution, was the most adequate for 
the country. According to Kemal its vagueness regarding the head of the state allowed them to 
advocate the Caliph to become the head of the state.
74
 The Liberals’ proposition to such a system 
would not permit Kemal to impose his absolute will in the country and it would have been easier 
to be controlled by the rest of the nationalists.
75
 Nevertheless, through the declaration of the 
republic, a more orthodox form of government was implemented and several ‘ultra-democratic’ 
aspects, as the lack of collective minsters’ responsibility, were abandoned, according to Halide.76  
Because of Rauf’s reaction,  the Radicals asked him to participate in a sitting of the 
RPP’s group and to defend his stance. If his explanations were considered inadequate he would 
face charges of high treason by the Independence Tribunals due to the amendment of the High 
Treason Law that forbade the act of defending the Sultanate and not recognizing as legal the 
decisions of the assembly.
77
 Despite the fierce attacks from deputies such as Yunus Nadi 
(Abalıoğlu), Recep (Peker) and Kılıç Ali, he confirmed his loyalty to the Republic, but to the 
Caliphate as well. Alongside, he put forward his concerns that the declaration of the Republic 
was not sufficient on its own to guarantee a system of popular sovereignty and that the constant 
changes in the form of the government created insecurity to the public that in the future the 
republic would be abolished as well.
78
 İsmet accused the critics of hurting the unity of the 
reformist forces in a period where this was of paramount importance. Despite Ali Fuat’s 
guarantee for Rauf’s loyalty and request from Kemal to be an impartial arbitrator, Kemal and 
İsmet wanted to use this opportunity to expel Rauf from the party. But most of the deputies 
regarded the event as a personal conflict between Rauf and İsmet and Rauf kept his position.79  
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The worsening relations between Ankara's and Istanbul’s press led to the arrest of the 
prominent, nationalist and ex-unionist journalist Hüseyin Cahit, who was personal enemy of 
İsmet since the Lausanne talks, by the Independence Tribunals while they were investigating 
possible interference in the Turkish politics by Muslims abroad. The charges were dropped but it 
revealed increasing attempts by the government to eliminate any hearths of criticism. Thus, 
Kemal met with prominent journalists from Istanbul who reassured him of their loyalty in the 
Republic but defended their right to criticize the shortcomings of the government.
80
  Meanwhile, 
complains for violations of the secrecy of correspondence were made by Rauf and İsmail 
Canboat.
 81
  
The existence of the Caliphate was a source of concern.
82
 In a meeting with Kemal before 
the abolition, Rauf, Refet and Ali Fuat had asked him to guarantee its future, as a useful source 
of loyalty of the people and due to the political tradition of being beyond the scope of criticism 
for the governmental policies. Kemal faced considerable problems for convincing the Imams in 
the assembly to support a Caliphate without temporal powers but only as a spiritual religious 
institution when the Sultanate was abolished.
83
 Moreover, it was used by reactionaries as an 
alternative to the republic in which the Caliph, who was still chosen by the Osman’s family, 
could become the Head of the state. The Caliph’s duties were to care for and secure the 
happiness and wellbeing of the global Muslim community and this created a huge burden for an 
impoverished country of 15 million with limited resources.
84
 Its appeal was further undermined 
after its failure to mobilize the Muslims against the Entente in WW1. Furthermore, it could 
create problems in Turkey’s relations with the major European powers which had colonies with 
Muslims. But its abolition presented a serious problem because it demanded of the TGNA, 
whose juristiction was limited in Turkey, to take a decision that concerned the whole Muslim 
world.
85
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The vagueness regarding the Caliph’s duties fueled the rumors for possible abolishment. 
For his supporters, such as Lütfi Fikri Bey, it was absurd that the criticisms for its role, did not  
come from abroad but from Turkey where the Caliphate could be a potential source of power and 
prestige. The increased party discipline in the Assembly by the government had stopped any 
debates and the assembly was called to sanction for predetermined bills. This tactic secured its 
complacency for the abolition of the Caliphate with the exception of Halit Bey and one more 
deputy.
 86
 
A new constitution was adopted in April 1924 where all the previous changes were 
consolidated. It had adopted a detailed description of individual rights and liberties, including 
‘the equality of the citizens before law: freedom of conscience, of thought; of speech and of the 
press, the right to work and travel; the right of private property and of association; freedom 
from arbitrary arrest, the prohibition of torture and forced labor; the sanctity of private 
residence, the inviolability of mail, compulsory and free primary education; freedom from 
discrimination on account of religion and race.’87 The Liberals’ proposals for the separation of 
powers, instead of the undividedness of national sovereignty in the Assembly as the Radicals 
advocated, and a two chamber-chamber parliament, a constant demand from Karabekir since the 
war years, were rejected. Nevertheless, the right of the President to dissolve the assembly and to 
veto its decisions was not adopted probably because it had to do with the rights of the parliament 
vis-à-vis the executive.88 Moreover, the president’s tenure was limited to 4 years, instead of 7 
and the cabinet had to obtain a confidence vote from the Assembly. According to Kasaba, all 
these changes secured a limited separation between the legislative and the executive.
89 
Despite 
the liberal influence in the constitution, in practice the assembly’s role was to function as a 
source of legitimization for the decisions of the government without being able to supervise the 
executive.
90
 
The rising trend of authoritarianism, such as the pressure upon Refet (Bele) to resign 
from his seat and to return to the army, led the former close associates of Kemal to pursue an 
autonomous course. In September, the future leaders of PRP (Progressive Republican Party) met 
                                                 
86
  Gazi Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), 1981 Pp. 1103, 1105, 1131 
87
  İ. Giritli, Fifty Years of Turkish Development, 1919-1969, İstanbul: 1969 p. 31 
88
  E. J. Zurcher, Political Opposition in the Early Turkish Republic, Leiden: 1991 p. 39 
89
  R. Kasaba, Turkey in the Modern World, Cambridge: 2008 p. 145 
90
  C. Koçak ‘Some Views in the Single Party Regime during the İnönü Period (1938-1945)’ p. 126 
33 
 
 
and they agreed on the main guidelines for the future, the formation of an opposition party and 
parliamentary group, to support the modernizing reforms, to stop any tendencies towards a 
dictatorial regime and to press Kemal to be an impartial arbitrator between the two parliamentary 
groups.
91
  
Kemal, aware of their intentions, in a speech in Trabzon declared himself a partisan of 
the republic and the social and mental revolution and ruled out the possibility to be an impartial 
arbitrator.
92
 In his following speech in Samsun, he did not support the idea of a multi-party 
system. Although he recognized that among the reformist forces might have been different views 
on the rate of the reforms, and that a competitive political system could function as symbol of 
modernity, he considered it as premature due to the important changes that had to take place, and 
the danger of undermining the nation’s unity.93 
Rumors on the formation of a new party appeared in October 1924 but Rauf refuted them 
in order to keep the element of surprise.
94
 The resignations of top generals from the army, such 
as Kazım Karabekir and Ali Fuat, created nervousness in the regime and fears were raised that 
the opposition might use the army for a coup d’état. Kemal attempted to meet with Ali Fuat and 
to deal with the problem although the meeting never took place.
95
 Simultaneously, he declared a  
conflict of interest for someone to both be in the army and the assembly and he delayed the 
participation of the resigned generals in the parliamentarian debates until their substitutes to 
reach them. Karabekir brought the issue in the assembly and was supported by deputy Vehbi Bey 
who argued that nobody has the right to deprive a deputy from his duties.
96
 
The opposition made its initial move in the start of the new parliamentarian session, with 
an interrelation concerning the acts of Recep Peker, as minister for the population’s exchange 
and settlement. Widespread rumors of corruption had created resentment even among cabinet 
members, such as the minister of commerce Hasan (Saka) and minster of national defense Kazım 
Fikri (Özalp) and it was a promising opportunity for weakening RPP’s rule.97 İsmet’s move to 
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change the interpellation for the whole government and not just for a single ministry forced 
deputies loyal to the government to support it and minimized losses.
98
 Furthermore, the 
opposition was inadequately prepared and there was lack of focus in their interventions although 
they had sufficient time to prepare. Meanwhile Rauf’s severe illness did not allow him to 
participate in some of the debates and the voting.
99
 In his speeches he continued to develop 
themes present from the previous period, which would be the core of PRP’s program. He made 
an acute critique of the existing Republic by declaring that a country under national sovereignty 
had to be called a democracy. He explained the constant use of popular sovereignty as a measure 
to make sure no one would take over the arbitrary rights of the Sultan, probably a veiled 
comment to Kemal and his growing despotism
100
 and declared the administration of Istanbul by 
appointed prefects a violation of people’s rights.101 
Despite their limited success and the broad majority that government secured as vote of 
confidence, they proceed in the preparation of the new party’s statutes. During the meetings the 
tensions that emerged among the dissident deputies and the threats to abandon the new venture 
shows that the level of political agreement was quite low, an event that supports the historical 
interpretation of personal, instead of political, differences in the emergence of the new party. 
Among the rejected proposals was Istanbul to be again the capital and a two-chamber parliament 
to be reintroduced, as was the case in the Ottoman Empire.
102
 Rumors that the opposition would 
have in their name the word ‘Republican’ forced RPP to include it as well on Recep’s initiative.  
PRP’s party program and manifesto103 is a thorough example of a liberal 19th century text 
of political philosophy. Its universality is been depicted by the lack of references to the imperial 
and Islamic past of Turkey or to more modern ideologies such as fascism, communism and 
socialism. With the concept of popular sovereignty as starting point, the need for a legislative 
branch in the government are justified on the basis of the impracticality of direct democracy in a 
vast country. In a similar manner, the government is responsible for the executive because it 
would be impossible for 400 people to process the everyday state affairs. Tyranny, as a potential 
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danger is recognized and can occur when the people’s rights for self-government are been 
violated and exercised arbitrarily by a suzerain or a party. This danger ccountered through the 
‘continuous competition between the nation and the executive’ with the assembly as a medium 
with a role to represent the interests of the ‘silent’ public.104 This continuous competition would 
not allow the executive to decide for important matters without taking into account the people’s 
views. In this process of continuous competition the parties, the parliamentarian groups, the 
public opinion and the press are considered important means. The need of consulting the public 
and to represent its actual views in the assembly had already been present in Rauf’s statements 
since the autumn of 1923 during the debates for the declaration of the Republic.
105
 
Furthermore, the rule of law was of paramount importance because laws were 
represented the people’s attempt to limit the reach of the executive, according to the original role 
of the parliaments. This notion restricted their actions only in the limits of the law and it was 
their biggest weakness in the conflict against RPP. (Kemal’s ruthless attitude and manipulation 
of TGNA, alongside the instrumental fashion in which matters as these were seen from the 
perspective of serving the final aim of westernization, allowed him to impose his will in the 
country.) The principles of republicanism, liberalism and popular sovereignty and the opposition 
against any reactionary movement delineate the margins for possible alliances with other 
political forces, as necessary concepts that had to subscribe. The interesting question in this 
matter is whether the RPP could abide by those principles. Although the probable answer is no 
the coexistence of the Liberals and Radicals since the CUP’s revolution of 1908 in common 
ventures does not allow for an easy answer. According to the PRP, the citizens of Turkey were 
adequately mature and politically trained to handle a multi-party democracy without tearing apart 
the country.  
As for any other proper liberal party, the collective and individual liberties are also 
important and could be an effective countermeasure against decay and degeneration through 
mutual criticism on issues such as education and ethics. In other words, those liberties would 
allow the people to express their views for those sensitive matters and through the spread of the 
dominant opinion, conformity could be established, which would then be the guide for the 
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government’s initiatives. A policy of respecting individual liberties could guarantee the social 
security and protection him from state arbitrary use of powers. Those statements came into sharp 
contrast with the RPP’s policies where there was less and less respect for personal liberties and 
the people’s mandate. Its disrespect for this mandate was expressed in the fact that the public 
was completely unaware of its policies after the 1923 electoral victory.
106
 
The party program was much more extensive than the RPP’s which had only the ‘Nine 
Principles’ as its public statement. This extensiveness was to highlight the need the public to be 
aware of what a party was intending to do and this principle would be followed in important 
decisions such as the amendment of the constitution. This reference aimed to stress the arbitrary 
fashion in which the RPP had approached issues like this, changing the constitution in a hasty 
manner without extensive deliberation as was expected from a regime under the popular 
sovereignty. But while the economic matters took the most important part of the program, even 
in this program there were minimum references to internal affairs and a complete lack of details 
on issues such as foreign policy, religion and culture.
107
 
An article that raised a lot of controversy and was used to shut down the PRP 6 months 
later, was §6 where the religious freedom and beliefs would be respected. Although it can be 
defended as a classic statement of religious liberalism, present in all the European constitutions 
since the French revolution, it could be interpreted as a veiled defense of Islam from the 
secularizing radical reforms of RPP. Nevertheless, PRP intended to discourage religious 
reactionaries from becoming party members. Article §8 demanded for direct elections, a measure 
compatible with their advocated liberalism although there were several liberal regimes, as in the 
USA, where two stages elections took place. Furthermore, in the framework of separation of 
powers the judiciary’s independence, individual protection from arbitrary decisions and the 
separation of politics and administration are mentioned. Specifically, the independence of the 
judiciary became an important question in the last year, when the Independence Tribunals were 
sent to Istanbul to silence the opposition press, and the trial of Hüseyin Cahit. 108 
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In their statements there were no criticisms for the already implemented changes and 
there is not substantial proof that the PRP intended to reverse them although as a possibility 
cannot be ruled out completely. A diplomatic report mentioned Dr. Adnan and his wife Halide’s 
comment that ‘things went too far’ but this is not sufficient as an indication of any hidden 
intentions by PRP.
109
 The refutation of the accusations of conservatism of the PRP comes from 
references of its support for all the institutional changes in Turkey until 1924. Ahmet (Ağaoğlu), 
a famous nationalist theoretician, correctly writes in an article in Vatan that the abolition of the 
Sultanate, the first radical move against the old regime, took place while Rauf was prime 
minister.
110
 
Kemal's answers to PRP’s statutes have been recorded in two versions of his interview 
for Times in November of 1924. The original one was sent in Britain but was never published 
and the second version was translated in Turkish and published in the Hükmiye Millîye.111  
In the original version of the interview
112, he doubts the sincerity of the opposition’s 
program due to the similarities of their program with RPP’s and he regards it as a sign of their 
covert conservatism. For him, they were conservatives because of their reluctance to support the 
republic and their allegiance with the Sultan. Even if they were sincere progressives, he could 
not understand the reason for launching an opposition party since RPP was pursuing similar 
policies. He avoided the adoption of a direct suffrage although it was considered as a possibility. 
Any charges of despotism could not stand because the assembly had not granted to the president 
the right to dissolve it or to veto its decisions. The limited support for PRP in the assembly 
would never allow implementing its program, making its existence meaningless. A similar 
remark is made in his Speech where the small amount of deputies joining it and its failure to 
overthrow the government were signs of political incompetence. Constantly consulting with the 
people could undermine the republic as a new institution. Any tendencies of despotism from him 
were based on the public’s immaturity and the need to accelerate a political procedure that had 
taken place for centuries in other countries. If he granted those privileges and liberties directly to 
the public the republic could be jeopardized. The different speeds at which people embrace  
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modernity created an ‘advanced vanguard’ which had to secure people’s compliance with the 
reforms by any means available.
113
 For him, Rauf and his associates were a typical case of 
reactionaries that failed to recognize the need for radical reforms.
114
 He had further elaborated   
the question of consulting the people in an interview with journalists in 1923. He believed it 
necessary for the government to respond to the public and to use its sentiment as a guiding force. 
Yet in order for this to take place properly, first a new generation of patriotic, modern, pro-
secularist citizens had to be raised.
115
 Furthermore, he could not reveal his plans in advance, 
because of the need to gather a broad spectrum of political support for the war. He considered 
false PRP’s view that the press in Istanbul represented public opinion and he thought that these 
statements represented only the views of the editors and nothing more. 
A completely different stance appeared in the published version of the interview.
116
 He 
regarded the existence of political parties and the respect of religious opinions and convictions as 
natural phenomena in republics. He recognized the article in the constitution that Islam is the 
state religion as a violation of this freedom but he defended its use as a tactical move in order to 
secure the support of the religious elements and suggested this provision to be removed in the 
next constitutional revision.
117
 His dual capacity as president of the republic and the party was 
not a problem because the actual duties of RPP’s leadership were executed by the vice president 
and he would take over only after the end of his incumbency. He considered PRP as a genuine 
party after abiding by all the laws and regulations that were expected of a new party. Its more 
elaborate program was due to the effort of some specialists to answer specific questions. This 
comment was about PRP’s program for the economy even if RPP did not need a text like this 
because it was applying its policy in day to day state affairs. He rejected any insinuations of 
despotism because the people of Turkey had a long fight against foreign invasions and Sultan’s 
absolutism and the members of PRP were also part of these fights, so no one could rule the 
country as a dictator. But where Kemal referred to freedom as a collective notion, the freedom of 
the nation, his opponents spoke of individual freedoms.
118
 Press’s critical stance to the 
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government was due to ulterior motives and their resentment of people in Istanbul because 
Ankara had become the capital.  
Kemal’s reconciliatory stance becomes apparent from the registration of the new party 
through Recep’s approval as minister of Interior, and the replacement of İsmet with Fethi, in his 
second and last incumbency as prime minister. Apart from Fethi’s reputation as a moderate, the 
other possible reason for this change, 12 days after the government had obtained a confidence 
vote, might be İsmet’s intention to have a more authoritarian stance to the opposition and to 
declare Martial Law. But Kemal’s reconciliatory stance, probably, minimized the losses of 
government deputies to PRP.
119
  
Fethi and his cabinet had to face not only the opposition but also the pressure from the 
hard liners in RPP, that came from İsmet, Recep and other deputies. So, in the presentation of the 
new cabinet Fethi stressed the partisan character and guaranteed the continuation of the reforms. 
Ali Fuat demanded a slower rate of reforms because of the people’s tiredness from the war and 
constant upheaval. Refik (Koraltan) reacted to this statement by mentioning that the army would 
support the reforms despite the people’s tiredness. This led to Fuat’s answer that the army was a 
protector of the republic in general and it should not be involved in party politics. That the army 
would guarantee the nation to take the right decisions is indicative of the radical’s mentality 
towards public sentiment.
120
  
In the end of 1924, two newspapers closed, after considerable pressure from the radicals 
for a stricter press control, because their articles had endangered the security of the country. Tok 
Söz had asked for the alliance of the whole opposition against the government which was 
described as a menace for the country. PRP defended the freedom of press as an inviolable right 
but the government found typical reasons for the decision. Immediately afterwards Recep 
resigned from the ministry of interior due to his conflict with the prime minister about the 
administration of big cities. Fethi shared the same belief with PRP and wanted elected mayors 
for these cities contrary to Peker who claimed that they should be run by appointed prefects.
121
 In 
the budget talks, PRP’s elaborate questions and proposals illustrates the significance of the 
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parliamentarian control to the executive for a liberal party. In this context they had proposed two 
commissions of experts to be created, one for the budget and one for the people’s welfare. The 
unanimous support for the abolition of tithe showed the popularity of this measure for both 
parties and their concern to secure the support of the peasants with a popular economic 
measure.
122
 
As an attempt RPP’s to secure its majority the party discipline was strengthened and no 
interpellations directed at the government from the government deputies, only regular 
parliamentarian questions. For an interpellation, the support of the majority was necessary in a 
closed sitting of RPP parliamentary group, which was almost impossible as long as the 
leadership kept its deputies under control. 
123
 
The Kurdish revolt of Sheikh Said 4 months later provided the perfect pretext for the RPP 
to suppress the opposition before it could make any changes to disrupt the government. In the 
parliamentary debates, Kazım Karabekir stressed the need for Turkish nation to be united in any 
internal or external dangers and the Martial Law for the eastern provinces was voted 
unanimously. But the same was not true for the High Treason Law due to the law’s prohibition 
of the use of any religious symbols for political purposes. Furthermore, these symbols were not  
defined adequately.
124
  
In a meeting between Fethi with Kazım Karabekir and Dr. Adnan, the former asked them 
to disband the party voluntarily. Fethi supported their rejection by mentioning that he would 
have done the same. The revolt increased the pressure from the Radicals in RPP and demanded 
the extension of the Martial Law in Istanbul, because of the subversive actions of the press there, 
the reinstatement of the Independence Tribunal and provisions for extensive powers to the 
executive. Meanwhile, rumors of PRP’s religious propaganda in the East spread and forced it to 
leak two letters to the press refuting those rumors.
125
 Kemal could not accept the use of the 
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religious freedom (that PRP supported) from the reactionaries in order to destabilize the 
country.
126
 
The emergency legislation notwithstanding, the moderate Fethi was considered as 
inadequate to deal with the insurgence and İsmet replaced him. The ‘Law for the Maintenance of 
Order’ was passed which gave the government a free hand over the next two years. It had the 
right to prosecute any political activity that would lead to subversive acts but which acts were be 
considered subversive was left completely vague. The reshuffle and the new law provoked the 
fierce reaction of the PRP which regarded it as unconstitutional and as a violation of the popular 
sovereignty because it did not provided for any checks and balances in its implementation and it 
could be used for the suppression of the press and the opposition. Meanwhile, martial law for the 
eastern provinces was deemed sufficient on the thought that revolt's ethnic character would not 
allow it to spread to the rest of the country.
127
 
Their estimation that this law would be used to suppres the opposition was accurate. 
When the law was passed, the revolt was almost over and its leader had been arrested and 
executed. Nevertheless, in the following period, all the opposition papers, except Cumhuriyet and 
Hakimiyeti Milliye, were closed down.
128
 Immediately afterwards, the local branches of PRP  
were shut down, following a police search of their offices and the seizure of their archives, while 
the branch in Istanbul had started preparations for a regional congress. In the justification for the 
closure of PRP by the government, the main argument was that several members of the party 
used the §6 of their program in a treacherous way and that the article in itself was not a violation 
of the high treason law for the political use of religion. Which means that they had to prosecute 
some of the PRP members individually instead of closing down all of its branches. Nevertheless, 
those actions did not culminate in the dissolution of PRP (‘fesh’ or ‘izale’) but in the closure 
(‘sedd’) of its branches.129   
All these measures left only the PRP parliamentarian fraction as a source of criticism. 
They continued to oppose any laws that further increased the extensive powers of the executive 
and they voted against the 1925 budget law. Furthermore, they criticized the lack of sufficient 
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time for preparation for new bills while being discussed extensively in the closed sittings of  
RPP's parliamentary group.
130
  
The possibility of PRP emerging as a viable alternative to RPP’s rule sufficiently 
explains the implementation of those measures by taking advantage of people’s need for the 
revolt to be suppressed swiftly and efficiently due to their extreme war-weariness after 10 years 
of almost constant warfare. The liberal tendencies of PRP, its respect for the freedom of press 
and religious freedom were viewed as a potential danger for the spread of propaganda from the 
religious reactionaries. But, Halide is right when she mentions that these acts, which led to an 
authoritarian regime, came through the proper constitutional order with legislation in TGNA.
131
 
The support for modernizing reforms closer to the political ideal of liberalism could have been 
considerable. Ahmet (Ağaoğlu), although a staunch supporter of RPP in the 1920s, in an article 
about how he envisaged the future in Turkey, claimed that it had to enjoy the rule of law and to 
be national, sovereign, liberal (hürriyetperver) and democratic.132  
The end of PRP came with the assassination plot against Kemal in 1926 and the arrest of 
all the eminent nationalists and politicians of Turkey who were not members of RPP or who 
might have challenged its rule in the future. Among them were all the PRP’s deputies despite 
their parliamentarian immunity. Rauf, alongside Dr. Adnan and Halide, managed to escape 
abroad and Kazım Karabekir was not convicted due to signs of unrest from the army but their 
political career were effectively over.
 133
  
Kemal's next reforms, now that no one could challenge him, continued to serve the same 
plan of a rapid, radical modernization with authoritarian measures and little concern for the 
public sentiment. The adoption of the Swiss civil code and the alphabet reform probably would 
have been supported by the liberals as well, as Halide mentions, but the case of the hat reform 
was different. As a measure that was clearly beyond the scope of public politics, it violated the 
most fundamental personal liberty and was beyond the limits of tolerance that liberals were 
prepared to show towards Kemal’s policies. The matter of culture, which the Hat reform was part 
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of it, put the radicals and the conservatives along with the liberals on opposing sides of the 
dividing line. For the non-radicals, state's intervention and social engineering in issues of culture 
was unacceptable and should be left to follow their own ‘natural’ evolution. 134 
Similar concerns were expressed for the directorate of Religious Affairs. The autonomy 
of religion vis-à-vis the state, as a feature of civil society, was violated. Religion was used by the 
state as a political means for serving Kemal’s political program. Halide’s approach for 
secularization was expressed in the constitution by the clause ‘Every adult Turkish citizen is free 
to adopt the religion he (or she) wishes to adopt’.135    
A constant theme in Halide’s works on the complete dominance of the Radicals in post-
independence Turkey is that it’s only temporarily attributable due to the ‘inherent’ qualities of 
the Turkish people of resistance to the rule of a single person.
136
 For her, this is embodied in the 
constant struggle of the people for freedom, after achieving independence, a struggle without an 
end, because of the inherent tension between authority and individual’s liberty. In a sense, for an 
advocate of political liberalism, this tension is at the core of the constant change of political 
landscape. Independence and liberty are contrasted with tyranny, and only freedom, for which 
independence is a prerequisite in itself but not sufficient to guarantee the future development of 
the people.
137
 Nevertheless, Hobsbawm’s analysis on the retreat of Liberalism stress its inability 
to create the necessary consensus in a society where competing cultural and ethnolinguistic 
identities exist as a result of the probable association of the ruling regime with one of these 
communities.
138
 The Kurdish revolt, which had strong religious and nationalist connotations, 
illustrates the ‘exclusiveness’ of the new regime and the need to prevent any centrifugal 
forces.
139
 Moreover, Halide, accurately, relates the emergence of the radical Kemalist regime to 
the delegitimization of the old world’s liberalism and its weakness in ending WW1. The political 
trend of the inter-war Europe was dictatorial regimes with strong executives in order to increase 
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the necessary modernizing reforms and contain the centrifugal forces which might undermine the 
social order.
140
  
Even after the trials of 1926, and the increase in the speed of the reforms that Kemal 
initiated, the emergence of a competing political system was not excluded and the experiment 
with Freedom Party (FP) took place. 
 
In the period between 1922 and 1926, the fight between opposing fractions of the 
westernizing nationalist movement culminated. In the end Kemal dominated through the skillful 
use of the parliamentarian majority and in full extent of the constitutional provisions to 
strengthen the executive. Despite its authoritarian practices, the regime kept several of its liberal 
provisions, apparent in the 1924 constitution, and legitimized all of its actions through its 
parliamentarian majority. The opposition, that choose to adopt a liberal political profile, 
considered themselves as rightful heirs of the nationalist movement and could not allow Kemal 
and his followers to monopolize this heritage. Their choice was partially based on their 
instrumentalism for ideological matters and partially in their belief that a proper modern state has 
to abide by the principles of liberalism. The second made them more moderate in the speed and  
the overall implementation of the reforms in the population but without considerable differences 
from the radicals in their future vision of the country, with the probable exceptions of the 
Caliphate’s survival and Istanbul’s remaining as the capital. Another aspect was that their actions 
were confined to the ‘proper’ mediums of parliamentarian activity and criticism through press, 
which was substantially different to Kemal’s practice. (The economy was not one of the fields of 
conflict in the 1920s, although it is certain that they would have opposed 1930s etatism.) Their 
instrumentalism is apparent from their desire to exclude all the elements that were against 
westernization from the political system and for suppressing other ethnoreligious identities. It is 
probable that they were hoping to retain the position of a liberal fraction in an all-inclusive 
nationalist party, along the lines of CUP, without having to leave it and form another party. Their 
support for Caliph, to become the head of the new state, would have meant that no-one could 
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have such prestigious position and a more ‘fair’ political game would take place among the 
opposing fractions.
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3. The Hybrid Nature of Kemalism in 1930s 
In the last chapter, I study exclusively the single-party regime of RPP in the 1930s after 
its ideological profile had been clarified. At a first level, I focus in the acts of the government 
that establish the historical framework for my analysis. At a second level, by using the concept of 
‘the hybrid nature of Kemalism’ I study its relation with Gökalp’s corporatism and Peker’s 
totalitarianism and I base this on other historical studies that have analyzed extensively the 
theoretical principles of Kemalism. In the last part, I attempt to incorporate Kemalism and 
Turkish republic in a European historical framework, by drawing some comparisons of Turkey 
with other authoritarian regimes and by using as a common denominator the need for answers in 
the problems of Liberalism’s dominance. Through these three levels of analysis, I show that, 
despite its authoritarian and totalitarian tendencies, Kemalism was much more influenced from 
liberalism than is generally believed.  
My interpretation is based on the ‘hybrid’ nature of Kemalism, which did not confine it in 
a certain family of ideologies. On the contrary it was influenced by fascist, corporatist and liberal 
ideologies, without been regarded identical with any of these. It allowed the transition to the two-
party regime of the 1940s and the 1950s and remains the conceptual framework of Turkish 
politics until today. If Kemalism had been a rigid monolithic, anti-liberal, anti-democratic regime 
in its core, then it would be unable to function as point of reference and it would have become 
obsolete in the post-war political order. I think the single most important point in an accurate 
ideological analysis of Kemalism is Kemal’s phrase ‘Biz bize benzeriz’ ‘we resemble ourselves’, 
and its consequent signification from different actors. This phrase, that Kemal used as a 
justification for the peculiar nature of TGNA’s government during the liberation war and, 
according to the PRP’s critique, was rejected later with the adoption of the Republic, have been 
dominant in Peker’s own analysis and interpretation of Kemalism. 
Peker and Gökalp’s relation with the single party regime of 1930s, is different and 
demands some clarifications. Gökalp was no longer alive when the ideological profile of the 
regime was clarified and its writings and views were used retrospectively and electively without 
fully implementing his corporatist ideal. Peker, in contrast, was one of the most prominent 
members of the regime and his ‘lessons’ came immediately after his removal from the party 
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general secretariat. In a sense, he is defending certain pro-fascist aspects of the regime and  
attempts to strengthen his position by spreading his views to the newer generation of bureaucrats 
and party members.  
Kemalism as Political Practice 
The first act in this period is the return of former Prime Minister Fethi (Okyar) from his 
post as ambassador in Paris in 1930 and the foundation of FRP (Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası - 
Free Republican Party). Fifteen deputies, all prominent members of the regime, joined the new 
party following Kemal's orders. The new party had a similar political identity to PRP and 
advocated a more liberal economic policy, respect of freedom of speech and direct elections. The 
widespread discontent boosted the appeal of FRP as an alternative to RPP and in the local 
elections of October it gained a small number of seats in local councils. After the electoral 
success, its leader Fethi,  increased its criticism to the government and in a heated debate in the 
parliament was accused with high treason by the hard-liners of RPP. The lack of support from 
Kemal, who had already declared himself a member of RPP and had gone against his assurance 
to Fethi that he would be an impartial arbitrator above party politics, led to the dissolution of 
FRP in November.
141
  
The incident in Menemen with the group of Dervishes led to further purges of supporters 
of the FRP and any attempts against a completely monolithic regime ceased. The newspaper 
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Yarın (Tomorrow), published by Arif (Oruç) from 1929, was allowed to criticize İsmet’s policies 
in the field of economy but it was closed down in 1931 and again a formal uniformity was 
established in all the views published.
142
 The significance of the TGNA in this period was lost 
and it was limited to confirm the decisions of a powerful executive on a par with the upper 
echelons of state bureaucracy.  
During the same period the role of the party changed considerably. Until 1929, its main 
contribution was to defend publicly the governmental policies but it was not involved in 
grassroots activism or mobilization of the masses.
143
 But the authoritarian character of the regime 
was further strengthened and at its peak partially resembled other totalitarian regimes in Europe. 
This was signified by the establishment of an apparatus of control not confined to the sphere of 
‘pure’ politics. Any civic organizations such as Freemason lodges, the Turkish Hearths, the 
Turkish Women Union, Teacher’s Union, the Reserves’ Officers Society and the Society of 
Newspaper Journalists, were eliminated and were replaced by party organizations such as the 
Halk Evleri and Odası (People’s Houses and Rooms) and the school for the party's orators.144 
The people’s houses were expected to function in 9 different fields; Language and Literature, 
Fine Arts, Theater, Sports, Welfare, Educational Courses, Libraries and Publications, Village 
Development and History. Due to the large numbers of illiterates, a wide reach of means were 
used to reach the people, but mostly speeches and lectures. The publications were numerous as 
well, the most important named Ülkü (Ideal) and based in Ankara.145 
Those changes can be explained through the main principles of any authoritarian regime, 
as it was the case for Turkey since mid-1920s; the instrumental fashion in concepts such as 
liberal democracy, constitutionalism and national/ popular sovereignty that can be related to the 
strong influence of positivism in Turkish nationalism, their class identity as officers and state 
officials, and the ultimate aim of their policy, which was the survival and strengthening of the 
state.
146
 The deep distrust for the masses also originated in the counter-insurgency of 1909 where 
the masses had been completely indifferent to protect the newly established Unionist regime. An 
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army of unionist officers from Thessaloniki had to ‘invade’ Istanbul to restore the regime.147 The 
incident of Menemen, with a similar indifference of the masses for the regimes’ reforms, was 
another incidence for their distrust towards people's views. 
But this process was not uniform. According to Y. Arat, the granting of equal and civil 
rights to women had strong connotations at the symbolic level. It differentiated the regime from 
fascist and Nazi regimes and reflected its intention to be aligned with liberal democratic 
regimes.
148
 F. Ahmad adopts a similar perspective. He considers acts such as the ‘secularization’ 
of public life and state policies, the introduction of universal suffrage, accountability of the 
cabinet to the assembly and a secular educational system as a ‘bourgeois revolution’. His eclectic 
references to the kemalist reforms served the purpose of maximizing Kemalism’s connection 
with other bourgeois revolutions. Kemal’s own personal decisions, to marry the daughter of a 
prominent business family from Izmir and to invest his personal savings in the newly founded 
Business Bank (İş Bankası), reflects the strong bourgeois tendencies in Kemal’s own behavior.149 
In 1936, King Edward’s unofficial visit was treated as official by the Turkish government. In 
order to improve relations with western democracies: Peker was removed from the general 
secretary after accusations that it gave the regime a fascist ‘hue’. Furthermore, Turkey supported 
the collective security and the League of Nations sanctions against Italian aggressiveness despite 
the severe impact in its depressed economy and the sympathizers for Italian Fascism in RPP’s 
ranks.
150
  
In the economic field, Turkey did not pursue an interventionist policy in the beginning 
but the relatively open market of the 1920s did not create huge increases in foreign investments 
due to Turkey’s weak position as a destination for capital-exporting countries like the UK and 
USA.
151
 Its policy cannot be considered, strictly speaking as ‘liberal’. The state did not confine 
itself to financing a police apparatus but undertook certain initiatives in order to promote private 
enterprise, such as the ‘Encouragement of Industry’ law.152 The economic crisis of 1929 and its 
right to adjust the custom tariffs for imports and exports since 1930 allowed the regime to pursue 
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etatism, i.e. a much more interventionist economic policy. It can be interpreted as the 
implementation of a mixed economy, because the state invested and controlled the sectors that 
were not interesting to the private sector, due to its inefficient capital or to low short-term profits. 
In any case, it provoked an internal division in the regime between statist bureaucrats and 
supporters of a less rigid statist economic policy, more in line with the national economy policies 
of CUP in WW1, with İnönü and Celal Bayar as leaders of the respective fractions.153 Kemal 
sided with Bayar’s fraction in 1937, when İnönü was sacked and Bayar became the prime 
minister, a move that reflected his dissatisfaction for the course of the economic policy alongside 
matters of foreign policy, such as the Spanish civil war and Italy’s irredentism in the 
Mediterranean Sea.
154 
Kemalism as Ideology 
Sat the same time, the RPP shaped its ideological identity through the publication of its 
program, congress’ proceedings etc in both the sphere of politics and ideology. Given the lack of 
references in political liberalism in those texts, its unpopularity in Europe was an important 
factor. But in the country as well, the growing cultural differences between the elites and the 
masses did not favor liberalism. It would enhance electoral body's political power in an 
environment of political competition and restrict intervention by the state in civic sphere. The 
attempts to create an original ideology without references to other competing political programs 
from abroad was heightened with the publication of the magazine Kadro, and RPP’s propaganda 
through the people’s houses. The lack of popular support for the new ideological apparatus, 
expressed as hostility or indifference for the new republican, secular morals, forced the republic 
to provide to the masses minimum political options and to pursue policies of Jacobination and 
social engineering from above.
155
 
Recep Peker, secretary general of RPP and minister of interior until 1936, was a staunch 
supporter of these policies. His ‘Lessons for the Revolution’ (İnkılap Dersleri) in the school of 
Political Science in Ankara, a highly prestigious department that trained future bureaucrats, 
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served two purposes. The first was to provide a conceptual framework for the Turkish revolution 
with references to European History, alongside an analysis of European politics, and the second 
was to strengthen the propagation of the Kemalist ideas. His teaching position in this institution 
was a demotion after he was sacked from the party secretariat. 
He considers all the policies that Kemal and his followers instigated since 1919 as a 
revolution (inkılap), and include these in a general analysis of revolutions which he classifies in 
two types; the Freedom’s Revolution (Hürriyet İnkılap) and the Class Revolution (Sınıf İnkılap) 
where the latter is considered a product of the former and takes place usually in liberal 
regimes.
156
  
These processes were linked with the emergence of modernity which was not related only 
with the growth of productive means and the advanced division of labor but also with 
considerable changes in the field of social collective identities. These, through increasing state 
interference, switched their point of reference from the family, the caste and the community to 
abstract universal values, such as religion, equality and justice in the case of liberalism, and law 
and order in the case of authoritarianism.
157
 In other words, modernity was associated with the 
revolution and Hobsbawm’s book ‘The Age of the Revolution’ is indicative of this view. In the 
field of politics and ideology, modernity changed the amount of mobilization by the masses and 
their involvement in the political sphere, a procedure that ended in the era of mass parties in the 
end of 19
th
 century. In a sense, in the Turkish republic, Kemalism was a transitionary ideology 
that intended to ‘educate’ the masses in pro-westernized direction, and its unpopularity was due 
to the masses conservatism and ‘anti-westernism’.  
The Turkish revolution, as Peker calls it, was one of freedom’s revolutions, a process that 
started in England, USA and France. A significant reason for the problems that occurred was the 
tendency to adopt the specific features of the English and French cases in every other country in 
Europe and Turkey, later on.
158
 This tendency of imitation, apart from being a way in which the  
aristocrats, monarchists and clerics secured their previous elite status in the new order through 
the revolution’s reduced radicalness, popularized a specific kind of ideal, named as liberalism. 
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But this political ideal with its consequent results of parliamentarism, individualism and 
economic liberalism, was unable to deal with the challenges in this new era.
159
 The most 
important challenge was socialism and the idea of class struggle which could undermine the 
social order due to the radicalization of the impoverished workers. This was further strengthened 
by the state’s limited power to control the public because of liberalism’s emphasis on individual 
liberties. Individualism, as one of the foundations of liberalism, undermined the national unity 
and the nation’s mobilization in a program of rapid and radical modernizing reforms, which was 
necessary for any country concerned to keep up with the more advanced countries and to secure 
its independence. Corporatism and Fascism, two distinctive trends, that Peker advocated, were  
attempts to solve these problems, without adopting liberalism or socialism.     
 Before the Turkish revolution, as Peker calls the national resistance movement and the 
Kemalist reforms, the Ottoman constitutional movement and the Young Turks’ revolt were also 
part of the freedom’s revolution.160 The main difference, according to Peker, is that Kemalists 
did not attempt to imitate the failed liberal standards, as the Young Ottoman and Young Turks 
did, and adopted a unique version of it according to the needs of the Turkish society. He 
considers that this imitation had created several problems in the empire: the instability of the 
ottoman state after 1908, the counterrevolution of 1909 from religious and anti-unionist 
elements, that nobody could stop an Orthodox deputy in the Ottoman parliament to phrase his 
loyalty for both the Greek and the Ottoman states, the killings of journalists for their articles due 
to their ill-conceived notion of freedom of the press without any regard to the sensitivities of 
public opinion.
161
  
Outside the Ottoman Empire similar problems emerged. In Germany, its ability to wage a 
successful war against the allies was undermined due to tense conflicts in parliament that also 
allowed the spread of propaganda from spies and socialists.
162
 After the war, attempts soviets to 
be founded in Kiel and Munich were crushed forcefully, although Germany functioned under the 
auspices of liberalism. In contrast, it restricted the means that the Italian state had at its disposal  
to control the uprisings among the disassociated war veterans and the soldiers due to socialist 
                                                 
159
  R. Peker İnkılap Dersleri 1936: Ankara p. 18, 19 
160
  R. Peker İnkılap Dersleri 1936: Ankara p. 10 
161
  R. Peker İnkılap Dersleri 1936: Ankara p. 26 
162
  R. Peker İnkılap Dersleri 1936: Ankara p. 24 
53 
 
 
propaganda. The social unrest stopped only when Mussolini and his movement took hold of 
power, as an authoritative, corporatist, anti-liberal alternative against the destructive effects of 
socialism and the inability of liberalism to guarantee social peace.
163
  
The problems in Germany and Italy were related to the emergence of capitalism and the 
almost incompatible interests between capitalists and workers. Because of this, Peker stresses the 
importance for each government to deal with these problems if it was to avoid a potential social 
destabilization or to implement a socialist program. As he listed down the alternatives, the full 
satisfaction of capitalist interests, due to the capitalists’ support for economic liberalism, would 
lead to a regime with unrestricted external and internal trade and the creation of a colony of  
advanced industrial countries. Moreover, their ‘greed’ would demand lower wages for the 
workers without limits in their work hours, which would increase the dissatisfaction of the 
workers and the appeal of radical socialist ideas. On the other hand, the complete satisfaction of 
workers’ demands would increase sharply the price of the products in the market, and hurt 
consumers’ interests, and especially peasants’ and middle classes’, which were not directly 
involved in this conflict. The ideal way for this to be solved would be through corporatism: it 
advocated respect of workers’ rights without increases in the prices of the goods in the market  
because mechanisms of control through consumers’ organizations would be established and the 
role of the middlemen and merchants would be eliminated or reduced.
164
 The character of the 
state’s economic policy was hotly debated among opposing views, without broad consensus in 
the quest to speed up industrialization without undermining the social order. Mehmet Ağaoğlu, a 
staunch supporter of authoritarian reformism in 1920s but a fierce opponent of the totalitarian 
tendencies in 1930s, drew a distinction between democratic etatism with a beneficial regulatory 
role and fascist-communist etatism which had a clear monopolistic, interventionist character.
165
   
At the political level as well, Peker’s answer would be the establishment of a system that 
could avoid all these inefficiencies and would secure the legitimacy of this new collectivity, the 
nation, by introducing corporatist ideas from Europe but without going to extremes in its 
adaptation. His rejection of liberalism was based in the disbelief that a stable social order could 
be based on the principle of individualism and rational choice. In a society where individualism 
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is dominant, everyone, including its politicians and parties, would pursue their own interest and 
would be reluctant to carry out the necessary sacrifices and to show the necessary solidarity 
required by the reforms in every aspect of life: social, cultural, economic and political.
166
 
Moreover, the Kemalist revolution was differentiated by the previous by attempting to change 
people’s everyday life and habits, a field out of reach for liberalism due to its respect for the 
inviolability of private life.
167
 
Peker’s corporatist proposals were based in the national solidarity, which would 
guarantee the complete support of the people for this ‘lead into the future’, based on the common 
of elements that made possible the emergence of the nations after the ‘Dark Ages’. Solidarism 
was very influential among Turkish nationalist thinkers due to the popularity of the French 
radical politician, Leon Bourgeois who first introduced this concept. The role of the party, in a 
single-party regime under the auspices of solidarism, had to be dominant due to its ability to be 
the medium between the state and nation and to secure the compliance of the nation to the orders 
of the state and vice versa. In the past, the state served the interests of the dynasty, the 
aristocracy and religious adversaries. An indispensable aspect in this process is the existence of a 
leader who would symbolize this national unity and effort with regards to his views, moral, 
beliefs etc. Exactly this need, i.e. for the party to represent the whole nation, demands that its 
program not be an ‘intellectual’ activity of one person or a group of people about state affairs, 
but to be based on the experiences of people from different social environments, and to 
synthesize all these different opinions.
168
 Another aspect of this voluntarist political philosophy 
was the call, for ‘idealists’ not to abandon the revolution and not to let its ‘warmness’ to go cold, 
events that would signify revolution’s loss of impetus. But even Peker recognized the fact that 
after a certain amount of time fatigue sets in as the public becomes less and less eager to support 
the radical changes, and the regime has to impose its will from above.
169
  
His analysis is simultaneously a justification of RPP’s policies since the national 
liberation movement. Its success establishing the complete independence of the Turkish nation, 
under the wise leadership of Kemal, secured the party’s legitimacy as the exponent of the 
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national will and as a promoter of policies according to the national interest, instead of being a 
servant of specific interests.
170
 And this a posteriori justification of certain acts and decisions 
from the Kemalist leadership can be applied in general in Kemalism, as political ideology. 
Instead of functioning as a guide for the future of the country, it was the creation of a coherent 
narrative with references to theoretical principles for the justification of the reforms that had 
taken place in Turkey until the 1930s.
171
 
But even in the case of Peker, liberalism’s rejection is not complete. Common elements 
in all the freedom revolutions, including the Turkish one, were the freedoms of speech, press, 
work, secrecy of letters, freedom of gathering and association, travel, profit and commercial 
activity, conscience, ownership and residence.
172
 In the analysis about the meaning of Kemal’s 
phrase ‘we resemble ourselves’ he also clarifies that civic liberties in the country and free 
economic activity were available to everybody as long the current labor laws were abided by and 
no exploitative tactics were pursued.
173
 
Solidaristic Corporatism was not only an underlying factor in Peker’s thought, it also had 
a strong influence on various decisions and policies of the Kemalists s a result of suppor from the 
most significant intellectual of Turkish nationalism, Ziya Gökalp. Its main difference with other 
political ideals was the way that society functions, which also defined as well the most 
appropriate course of action. In liberalism, the individual is the unit of analysis. There is an 
essentially anarchic approach to society, and conceived as the sum of individuals, while progress 
takes place through the ‘invisibly regulatory workings of their egoistic interests’. Corporatism 
considered the corporation, partially resembling the Marxist concept of class, as the unit of 
analysis but refrained from advocating its revolutionary prospects and preferred to use it in order 
to maintain the social order. Individuals can pursue their personal interests as long as it did not 
undermine social solidarity neither violated public interest. It was an ideology for monopoly 
capitalism and a solution for speeding up primary accumulation through protectionism.
174
 
Gökalp’s corporatism was combined with nationalism inextricably; ‘nation’ had replaced 
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‘society’ as dominant concept and corporations functioned as a tool of social organization for the 
national body, which constituted the society.  
The complete adoption of Gökalp’s corporatist ideal demanded a national confederation 
of all the occupational groups which would eliminate the conflicts among different occupations, 
employers and employees. Although this was never fully adopted, Kemal’s motto ‘These 
(occupational) groups are mutually necessary, and complementary to one another’, was used 
extensively by the regime.
175
 Despite Gökalp’s importance, none of his books were transcribed 
in the Latin alphabet until 1939, perhaps because of his ideas of solidaristic corporatism that did 
not completely reject political liberalism, according to T. Parla’s analysis. The spread of ideas 
such as this might have led to demands for more political freedom in the 1930s.
176
 
In Kemalist texts its hybrid nature and its eclectic affinity with an array of opposing 
ideologies, was also expressed through the concept ‘Halk’ (people). Since 1922 when Kemal 
founded the People’s Party (Halk Fırkası) he was quick to deny any associations of a new 
venture with the Left. In that era the point of reference for the nationalists was the ‘nation’ 
(millet) and the concept of the ‘people’ was used by forces in the left of political spectrum. The 
small number of big landowners, merchants, industrialists and industrial worker undermined any 
dangers of class struggle in the new country, in contrast to other European countries. An increase 
in the living standards of the peasants could take place without challenging the benefits of the 
other classes. In this view of class harmony instead of class struggle, the concept of ‘the people’ 
served as well the purpose of strengthening the anti-elitist character of the regime. The spread of 
nationalist and modernist messages to the masses was the main duty of the party and not a 
socialist agenda, despite their similarities in the relation between the vanguard and the masses. 
This view about the role of the elites made them instrumental in order for the program of radical 
modernization to succeed and the parliamentarian majority to be secure due to the elite origins of 
all the political personnel and deputies. The regime’s populism intended to stress that 
leadership’s scope served both the popular and the nation’s will and not the needs of a dynasty or 
imperial elite. But this argument was undermined by the need to unite all the progressive 
elements in this purpose, an indication of the reforms’ unpopularity with the masses. Similar  
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populist modernizing political programs that influenced Kemalism were the Russian experience 
of Narodniki and the 1916 movement towards the people (Halka doğru).177 
The populism of the regime was combined with a theoretically strong parliament, despite 
its lack of real power. As T. Parla explains ‘The accompanying major structure in the liberal 
model, through which the articulated and aggregated interests are transformed into 
authoritative, central political decision, is the institution of parliament. Supremacy of the 
parliament, elected according to the territorial principle and functioning according to the 
majority principle and to the principle of electoral mandate given to the government-party for 
the duration of its term, is axiomatic in the liberal model. This is the principle of the primacy of 
the legislature or the principle of ‘parliamentary legitimacy.’178 
But even in Gökalp’s writings, and definitely in Kemalist practice, the role of parliament 
contained certain contradictions. He supported the unity of power in the assembly because of its 
potential as an effective medium of representation for all the different elements and 
organizational groups that constitute the nation, but he never objected to the lack of 
constitutional checks for the executive and the leader, which led eventually to its complete 
supremacy.
179
  
The hybrid nature of Kemalism, that occupied a place between Corporatism and 
Liberalism is depicted quite clearly in Parla’s analysis for Gökalp. He considers the possibility of 
corporatism included in a political system with liberal institutions as was the case of Turkish 
republic. For certain acts, the consensus of organized interest groups or informal structures 
would be obtained before the decisions of the government. During crises, the role of the 
parliament to control the executive could in practise be abolished through legal-ideological 
justifications or more subtle deliberations. Nevertheless, the lack of organized interest groups in 
Turkey, due to a partial implementation of corporatism, and the small division of labor did not 
allow them to function as a buffer between the state’s authority and the rights of the individual as 
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long as those rights did not violate the ideal of social solidarity.
180
 Kemalism’s role as a 
progressive bourgeoisie revolution demanded the alliance of all pro-reformist forces, including 
the conservative elements in the countryside that began opposing the Sultanate only after his 
alliance with Entente, the Liberals, which represented the entrepreneurial classes in Istanbul and 
Western Turkey, and the radical pro-authoritarian officers and state officials. 
181
  
Despite the more totalitarian, fascist tendencies inside the RPP, it did not develop a 
thorough fascist alternative to liberalism and the hybrid nature of the regime remained. In the 
level of state legislation, several laws in the mid-1930s further enhanced the control of the state 
on civil society but those measures remained partial and they never crystalized in an all-inclusive 
state-society sphere.
182
  
Kemalism in European Context 
The Turkish republic was founded and Kemalism became its dominant ideology just after 
the western civilization of 19
th
 century came to an end. This civilization was liberal in legal and 
constitutional terms, capitalist in its economy, had an absolute belief in the benefits from science 
and was bourgeoisie in the image of the class that had the hegemony.
183
 In the ideological 
framework of the inter-war Europe, most of the non-liberal ideologies appeared as responses to 
the problems from the spread and dominance of liberalism. But this process was not completed 
until the 1930s, and the strength of the liberal paradigm is apparent from the amount of regimes 
that were established after WW1 in which a democratic assembly of representatives ruled the 
country. The fact that in most of them, an authoritative alternative emerged until the beginning of 
WW2, illustrates the retreat of liberalism and its weakness in facing the challenges of inter-war 
Europe.
184
  
Socialism and Communism were among the most prominent enemies of liberal 
democracies in the early mid-war period although they shared the intellectual heritage of 18
th
 
century, the rationality and humanism.
185
 This common cultural heritage differentiated them 
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from the conservative, traditionalist, corporatist and fascist ideologies and allowed them to unite 
against Nazi Germany. The main problem that socialist ideologies addressed was the inherent 
paradox of liberal political thought: that a social nexus of self-interested individuals could create 
a stable society while economic liberalism enhanced the problems of distribution of wealth 
among the lower classes.
186
 Despite attempts from some intellectuals in Kadro, socialism had 
minimal appeal in Turkey, its cordial relations with Soviet Union notwithstanding, because was 
hindering the creation of an indigenous bourgeoisie class and due to its inherent internationalism, 
an important difference with the, increasingly militant and exclusive, nationalism of Turkish 
republic.
187
 
Besides liberalism and communism, this period saw the emergence of an array of 
corporatist, conservative, totalitarian regimes but apart from their suspicion towards the liberal 
ideal and the overt anti-communism, they had few similarities. 
The first case was the conservative, authoritarians who in the Ottoman and Turkish 
context were the main opponent of the Kemalists. Although hard to be defined, these ideologies 
had some common characteristics, according to E, J. Zürcher’s definition; ‘the importance of 
religion, the danger of inflicting injustice to individuals, the reality and desirability of 
distinctions of ranks and station, the inviolability of private property, the view of society as 
organism instead of mechanism and the value of continuity with the past’. Authority was not  
contractual basis, as was the case with liberalism, but in some established patterns bearing 
legitimacy due to their connections with the past. With important leaders in England and 
Germany, such as Disraeli and Bismarck, this set of attitudes or ideology faced their opponents, 
liberalism and socialism which draw legitimacy from the Enlightenment and the French 
revolution.
188
 Kemalism, despite its eclectic approach to these, was clearly a product of the 
Enlightenment and the French revolution and could not establish a regime with a traditionalist 
outlook. This made it different to others, for instance from Franco’s regime in Spain, one of the 
most notable examples of this trend, which used extensively religious and traditionalist symbols, 
and the King as a source of loyalty.
189
 But in both countries, the weak hegemony of a liberal 
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democratic ideal and the challenges of modernization pushed them to create regimes with 
nominal democratic institutions and a powerful executive in the hands of a former general. 
Turkish nationalism since the end of 19
th
 century had been heavily influenced by 
corporatist solidaristic ideologies, due to the popularity of politicians such as Leon Bourgeois. 
These attempted to respond the problems that emerged in the transition from aristocratic 
democratic regimes to mass politics with the adoption of universal suffrage and the election of 
deputies from lower stratums.
190
 The aim of solidaristic corporatism, in Taha Parla’s 
terminology, or organic statism in Eric Hobsbawm’s, was to replace the liberal ideal of the 
individual and the socialist concept of class struggle with the notion of society as an organic 
community in which everybody willingly accepted his role and did not demand subversions of 
the social order. Although corporatism was never fully implemented in Turkey, it filled some of 
Hobsbawm’s requisites: the electoral democracy was restricted while officers and state officials 
ruled from above.
191
 The retreat of liberalism was not confined to the European continent, but 
was present in America as well. The phenomenon of a nationalist leader, who was educated in a 
liberal environment and became the head of a single-party regime with a protectionist statist 
economy, was also seen in 1930s Mexico.
192
 
Fascism and Nazism were quite different from other rightist regimes in the 1930s through 
the mobilization of the masses from below and the rejection of traditional sources of power such 
as the Church or the King. Their eclectic relation to modern culture and traditional values, and 
their adoption of all the modern technological means and techniques of mass politics, were their 
main characteristics.
193
 The Kemalists’ flirtation with these trends was due to a combination of 
internal and external causes. The Menemen incident and the popularity of FRP reinforced the 
views of hard-liners that the people were not ready for a competitive political system, or that a 
system as this was not desirable in any case (according to the views of different fractions inside 
RPP). Moreover, the inability of liberal regimes to cope with the economic and social problems 
of recession and the apparent success and social stability of Italy and Germany were instrumental 
in their popularity, a trend that was expressed through Peker or Kadro’s articles. Due to the 
                                                 
190
  E. Hobsbawm Age of the Extremes; Short Twentieth Century London: 1995 p. 110 
191
  E. Hobsbawm Age of the Extremes; Short Twentieth Century London: 1995 p. 113-114 
192
  C. V. Findley The Turks in World History 2005: OUP p. 209 
193
  E. Hobsbawm Age of the Extremes; Short Twentieth Century London: 1995 p. 118 
61 
 
 
common corporatist origins of Turkish Kemalism, Italian Fascism and German Nazism, they 
despised class conflict as an unnecessary division that would bring harm to the national body. 
Moreover, they considered the supreme role of the state legitimate, which was controlled by the 
only legitimate party, and its intervention in the society. The 10
th
 anniversary of the republic in 
1933, which was celebrated with a public speech from Kemal in front of a mass audience 
alongside parades and gymnastics, and the institutional merging of the state and the party in 1936 
through the demand that all the administrative officials be party members were prominent 
examples in this ‘flirtation’.194  
But apparent differences were present as well; Racism and eugenics had limited appeal in 
Turkey, despite the spread of racist theories in the 1930s, the cult of the self-made man was 
almost absent, the masses did not participate in events of public admiration, and Turkey lacked 
any irredentist foreign policy: no lost motherlands were waiting to be incorporated in the 
country: although its leaders were among the defeated in the WW1 and territories such as 
Macedonia were lost even if they were Kemal’s and others’ fatherland. But the most prominent 
differentiating factor was that totalitarian Kemalism did not emerge in order to save Turkey from 
class struggle and socialism, as was the case with Fascism and Nazism.
 195
 
 
So, Kemalism in the 1930s reached its anti-liberal peak and almost established a 
totalitarian regime alongside the guidelines of Fascism. The complete domination of the civic 
sphere from the party and the dissemination of party ideology to the masses through the people’s 
houses were notable cases of this tendency. Moreover, parliament had lost any real power and 
the government, took advantage of the lack of constitutional checks and a rigid party discipline 
in the parliament, by imposing its will in the country without restrictions. The merging of the 
party and state structures and the celebration of the 10
th
 anniversary for the establishment of the 
republic imitated almost completely other totalitarian regimes.  
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But this process was not uniform and Kemalism retained its hybrid ideological nature. 
First of all, in economic field, etatism was not competitive towards the private sector but 
supplementary. Its aim was to speed up the primary accumulation and the industrialization of the 
country. The argument that statism had blocked the investments of private capital cannot be 
accurate.
196
 In the 1930s, in the middle of global recession, the allocation of capital in a 
backward, agricultural economy with low expected short term profits did not look promising due 
to the small internal market and the decreased income of consumers in Europe. In 1930, the 
regime experimented with a tame opposition party and some of the hard-liners were removed 
from important positions until 1938. In foreign affairs, Turkey resisted Italian irredentism and 
supported the sanctions from the League of Nations. The granting of political rights and legal 
equality to women was also a differentiating factor. Peker’s analysis of the Turkish revolution, 
despite his extended critique of liberalism, does not manage to disassociate Kemalism from it 
completely. Certain liberal aspects remain desirable, precisely because they are related to the 
essence of any modern political regime. This relation between Kemalism and Liberalism is 
signified by his views that the Turkish revolution belongs in the same genealogy of French 
revolution. Even Gökalp’s corporatism, though never fully adopted, had considerable influence 
in the ideology of the regime and it was a theory that did not deny completely liberalism, but 
intended to remove the destabilizing effects of individualism within the social order. Lastly, any 
totalitarian aspects of Kemalism in 1930s, did not influence the institutional and constitutional 
outlook of the regime. Turkey continued to function under the façade of liberal institutions which 
would allow a more open and competitive political system, as was the case in 1940s.
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Conclusions 
In this study of the early Turkish republic I approached the emergence of Kemalism from 
the bigger trend of Turkish nationalism with reference to liberalism in order to illustrate 
Kemalism’ peculiar ideological nature, described as ‘hybrid’. This allowed Kemal to draw on 
influences from competing and exclusive political paradigms without being wholly identified 
with any of these. 
In the first period, during the resistance’s movement against the Entente and the Sultan’s 
authority (1919-1922), a broad collation of nationalists was considerably successful at the 
political level, alongside the victories in the battlefield. This movement, in which the future 
Kemalists were a minority, consolidated its authority as a medium for the silent nation’s will vis-
à-vis peoples’ loyalty to the Sultan, that was the Ottoman Empire's fundamental source of 
legitimacy. Further along, this was achieved without excluding the Sultan from a future order 
though it was expected that after the win against the Greeks, the Sultan would recognize the 
principle of national sovereignty as supreme source of power. And this was combined with a 
policy of stressing the continuity of Istanbul’s and Ankara’s legal and institutional authority. 
Most of the documents, laws and statements of the nationalists’ government accepted as a base 
the previous laws of the Sultan and amended only specific aspects. This continuity is related with 
Liberalism as well. I consider accurate Peker’s claim that the constitutional movement of 1878 
and Young Turks’ revolution is the adoption of French Revolutions’ principles in the ottoman 
context. The attempt of the nationalists in Ankara to stress the continuity between the two 
authorities signifies their will to accept this political heritage as well. This was not accepted by 
everyone. But the supporters of the Western ideal, according to Halide’s conceptualization, due 
to their significance as politicians and officers and their political experience, made sure that the 
movement would not to end up in a complete rejection of those principles, or to adopt them 
through a Marxist framework. Kemal’s instrumental approach in those matters allowed him to 
establish a regime, without the normal procedures and checks that the supporters of western ideal 
advocated. In this regime his authority was constantly strengthened and the actual control of the 
executive by the assembly was undermined. Nevertheless he sided with them so as to avoid a 
pro-Bolshevik regime that would undermine the fragile social alliance between disparate 
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political currents through radical social and economic reforms, as some of the supporters of the 
Eastern ideal advocated. The skillful call to the people to fight for their independence and 
freedom, included national and collective freedom alongside the respect of the individual rights 
(individual freedom), a freedom that was explicit in the statements of Ankara’s government.  
The following period, until 1926, the united movement of nationalists that advocated the 
westernization of the country came apart due to different approaches in the way that the country 
had to move on. This division was strengthened by the despotic tendencies of Kemal who wanted 
to monopolize the heritage of resistance against the Entente. The opponents of Kemal, who were 
important members of the resistance movement and with significant contribution in various key 
positions, saw liberalism as the most effective way to illustrate the increasing authoritarianism of 
Kemal and to provide an alternative for the necessary westernization of the country. They would 
prefer the reforms to be implemented in a more moderate fashion straining the tolerance of the 
masses for foreign customs and morals. And they preferred a regime with a plurality of fractions 
in which the head of state, the Caliph or a politician, functioned as an impartial arbitrator to the 
party politics, a model that resembled the Ottoman Empire. Kemal, despite his growing 
authoritarianism, conformed some of his demands, for instance in the constitution of 1924, in 
which the presence of liberalism was quite strong and a more rational political system was 
envisaged without the ultra-democratic aspects of the war regime. Nevertheless the proposal for 
a two-chamber parliament was rejected. Except from being a sign of continuity between the old 
and new order, it could check the parliamentarian majority of the government party, because it 
would have a senate, as a second chamber, with strict qualifications for its appointed or elected 
members.  
In the third chapter I focused in Kemalism’s hybrid ideological nature due to its eclectic 
affinities to other ideological trends in Europe. In other words, although Turkey was really 
different to a liberal democracy according as in England or France, it was not a per se totalitarian 
regime along the lines of Italian Fascism or German Nazism and retained its uniqueness.  
Among others, the most prominent reason for this interpretation was the following: 
Turkey functioned throughout this period on the basis of 1924 constitution in which there were 
no provisions for a single party regime and the respect for individual rights and freedoms was 
explicitly mentioned. This respect was present even in Peker’s text, an adversary of a non-liberal 
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regime with strong influences from Italian fascism. Probably this is due to the heritage of 
Freedom’s revolutions: any regime that was the product of this process had to show some respect 
to individual rights and freedoms and to retain a façade of democratic institutions. Moreover, 
parliament theoretically had the power to rule the country. As an institution it gained legitimacy 
after the 18
th
 century rationalism, the French revolution and the dissemination of popular 
sovereignty as a concept. The supremacy of the executive was consolidated only through an 
obedient parliamentary majority. The ceremonies of Fascist and Nazis regimes in which the 
Leader would appear in front of mass gatherings, took place only once, in 1933. Turkey never 
fully supported Italian irredentism and sided with the liberal states against it. Another important 
differentiating factor among Fascism and Kemalism was that in Turkey the small number of 
workers could not challenge the social order. The corporatist ideal was never fully implemented 
but functioned, alongside populism, as a reference for the scope of the governmental policies,  
that aimed to satisfy the needs of all the classes and stratums and not just the interests of a 
sovereign or the imperial bureaucracy.  
In the economic field, etatism never intended to replace the activities of private sector. 
Rather the state took responsibility of investing in sectors of economy that were not interesting to 
the industrialists because of the sparsity of capital. Due to this, Celal Bayar replaced İnönü as 
prime minister, an advocate of a more liberal economic policy, although his liberalism was not 
apparent in politics. This took place after the removal of Peker from the general secretariat, due 
to the fascist coloring that gave to the regime and the problems that created in foreign relations 
with the liberal states. The political and legal equality of women was in sharp contrast with 
conservative and fascist views about their role in a modern nation state. And several reforms 
since the 1920s, such as universal education and the secularization of the public sphere were in 
line with 18
th
 century Enlightenment. 
This hybrid nature of Kemalism allowed it to remain the conceptual framework of 
Turkish politics until today, with small changes in its core. If Kemalism was just a product of the 
mid-war anti-liberal trend, it would have become obsolete very quickly, as was the case of its 
totalitarian tendencies of 1930s that receded in 1940s. Eighteenth century rationalism, 
constitutionalism, respect of individual rights against arbitrary state (dynastic) power, 
corporatism so as to avoid the social upheaval of other modern capitalists countries, a strong 
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nationalism with emphasis in national unity and solidarity and the need to speed up the 
industrialization of the country in order to secure its independence, created a complex field of 
opposing influences in which a coherent ideological outlook was not possible but allowed 
liberalism to retain some of its influence in the Early Turkish Republic.
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